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**JOINT TASK FORCE XXI:
SOF AS EXECUTIVE AGENCY
IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

by

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December 1997

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MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

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Captain, United States Army
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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


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ABSTRACT

While the US military faces growing requirements to conduct Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), our command relationships are mired in the past, optimized for war, not MOOTW. General Purpose Forces are normally earmarked for Command and Control (C2) of these operations, with primarily conventional commanders, staffs, and service components establishing the Joint Task Force (JTF). Special Operations Forces (SOF) support the JTF. However, given the capabilities of SOF, this command relationship does not take advantage of SOF's strengths, and at times actually impedes our overall efforts.

SOF can provide the regional CINC with superior multi-echelon C2 in MOOTW. This thesis will demonstrate that the current US military C2 system is unsuitable, and that by changing it we will dramatically improve mission success probabilities, efficiency, and overall combat effectiveness. This thesis examines US operations in Somalia (Restore Hope) in order to shed light on key areas of sub-optimization. A SOF-based organization (JTF-XXI) will be proposed and compared to the Restore Hope JTF. The thesis will argue that the JTF-XXI is more effective and efficient, and should be adopted for future use.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As we approach the twenty-first century, the United States military increasingly finds itself called upon to perform non war-fighting tasks at home and abroad, yet is unable to maximize its available resources because of how it organizes for such operations. Our military approaches most such missions with essentially the same command and control structure used for war. Ad-hoc Joint Task Forces (JTFs) are established by the regional CINC, component service organizations are provided, and the units deploy to feed the hungry, fight the insurgent, etc. These JTFs are normally formed from conventional maneuver commands, and are more accustomed to closing with and destroying the enemy than juggling the myriad of competing demands inherent in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Special Operations Forces, however, are trained, organized, and equipped to provide dynamic, effective, and efficient command and control of MOOTW forces when supported by conventional combat and combat support elements.

The theater Special Operations Command (SOC) is the ideal basis for MOOTW Command and Control. Joint Task Force-XXI uses the SOC as a standing, rapidly-deployable skeleton for the JTF. Augmentees from the components would fill out the JTF, and the components themselves provide the tactical maneuver and support capabilities. Most importantly at the tactical level, Special Forces (SF) headquarters provide tactical command and control, and SF "A" teams spread out over the operational area. Each assumes control of a specific sector and all those operating within it, including conventional US and coalition forces, government agencies and, to whatever extent

possible, non-governmental agencies. Special Forces teams are well-suited to such extensive responsibilities. They are trained and equipped to integrate civilian and military elements, are culturally and linguistically oriented, and can smoothly transition between combat and peace operations as the situation dictates. Finally, SF establishes a very discrete "footprint" while still being able to develop a great deal of human intelligence (HUMINT), an invaluable skill in such environments.

An in-depth examination of early large-scale US operations in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope, Dec 92-May 93) reveals serious organizational shortcomings on the part of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF performed admirably in one area, that of feeding the hungry. However, it found itself unable to address the real problems that would come back to haunt the UN and US forces during United Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). UNITAF was incapable of recognizing the nature of the operational environment from the outset, and never recovered. Aidid and other Somali war-lords were thus able to husband their resources and wait for a predictably weaker UN force before showing their true colors. The result was hundreds of US and UN casualties and an eventual international military withdrawal from Somalia.

Although the nation-building portion of the UN mission to Somalia may very well have failed regardless of US efforts, we nevertheless contributed to the failure. JTF-XXI, as described in Chapter II, would have provided a more efficient and effective alternative to UNITAF. JTF-XXI would have been more aware of its operational environment from the outset, and might even have been able to wrest the initiative from the Muhammad Farah Aidids for more than brief moments. In many respects, Somalia resembled insurgency warfare. If the government (in this case the US and its coalition partners) is

unable to control the country and preempt the opposition in all areas, civil and military, then it may be defeated by the insurgency.

Some adjustments must be made in order to accommodate JTF-XXI, and it will produce effects on our military. The SOC must be upgraded to a two-star billet to ensure he has enough rank to command all components. This also implies that the JTF-XXI organization does not require a force so large as to be commanded by a more senior officer (an Army corps or Marine Expeditionary Force is often overkill in MOOTW, and may exacerbate the problem). Components should be somewhat self-supporting, such as Army Separate Brigades and Marine Expeditionary Units. These components, while physically smaller, must be highly diverse and robust. Doctrine must be revised, and Special Operations Forces should train more frequently at the tactical level with conventional units (playing separate roles on the same joint exercise does not count). The JTF-XXI is a much flatter, network-type organization than the current hierarchical type, and information technologies can further enhance the advantages of such a system.

The General Purpose Forces (GPF) have the most to gain overall from JTF-XXI. Conventional units will be utilized to a greater extent within their war-fighting specialties, and thus need to train less for MOOTW. Smaller force packages will decrease GPF OPTEMPO, thereby enhancing morale and readiness. Special Forces might see some increases in OPTEMPO, but will also see vastly improved readiness. JTF-XXI tasks include most of those which Special Forces units are called upon to perform in wartime. Special Operations personnel usually come back from these missions more capable than before, while conventional units must train for months to return to an acceptable level of

combat readiness. This concept would produce a win-win situation for our military and those we are trying to help.

I. INTRODUCTION

The problems of victory are more agreeable than the problems of defeat, but they are no less difficult.

Sir Winston Churchill [1]

A. OVERVIEW

The United States military today has the opportunity to dramatically improve the way in which it conducts Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The current U.S. military Command and Control (C2) system for many of these operations is unsuitable. By changing it in the manner I propose in this thesis, the United States can increase mission success probabilities, improve efficiency, and ultimately raise the combat effectiveness of our military. Typically, General Purpose Forces (GPFs) are earmarked for C2 of these operations, with conventional background General Officers and staffs designated as the Joint Task Force (JTF), and predominantly conventional forces composing the service components. Special Operations Forces (SOF) support the JTF as a component. Army Special Operations Forces, particularly Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), and Psychological Operations Forces (PSYOP), are recognized as highly capable, flexible, and invaluable in support of the JTF in MOOTW, even more so than in war. This supporting relationship has proven indisputably successful in war, where the focus is on the application of firepower and maneuver, and the GPF dominates. Nevertheless, given the capabilities and untapped potential of SOF, particularly Special Forces, this is not the optimum command relationship for most MOOTW. GPFs are not organized, trained, or equipped specifically for these missions. From the corps staff to the rifle squad or tank crew, these forces are designed to close with and destroy the enemy,

not to deal with the unusual operational environment inherent to MOOTW. SOF has evolved to the point that it can provide the regional Commander-in-Chief (CINC) with superior multi-echelon Command and Control than can be provided by the GPF.

The current GPF-based JTF is a traditional hierarchical organization designed for a narrow, strict span of control. Multiple layers of command are employed to minimize the span of control. Communications and directives flow vertically, not horizontally, and effective control is retained at the highest level possible. The GPF structure calls for a large, closely-knit support infrastructure in order to maintain even marginal functionality. SOF C2, however, is inherently network-based, and is well-suited to take full advantage of current and emerging information technologies. Special Forces' traditional Unconventional Warfare (UW) role encouraged its design early on as a C2 force multiplier. Each SF detachment is capable of near-autonomous operations with indigenous forces of up to battalion strength, while still maintaining a close communications link over vast distances with sister units and higher headquarters. This thesis demonstrates the potential of SOF C2 through an in-depth analysis of US/UNITAF operations in Somalia (Operation Restore Hope). The Somalia case-study provides a valuable tool for an examination of GPF organizational mission-related short-comings in MOOTW, and how the SOF model addresses these specific problem areas.

Benefits of SOF C2, in addition to increased mission success probabilities, would be felt across the military and political landscape. Due to the inherent flexibility of SOF, smaller force packages would be required. SOF is a recognized force multiplier, able to increase the efficient use of supporting General Purpose Forces, governmental and non-

governmental organizations (NGOs), and indigenous or United Nations assets. Smaller force packages entail decreased transportation and logistics costs, a lower media profile (hence less political impact), and less negative impact on overall GPF combat readiness.

B. BACKGROUND

In the words of US Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen in reference to the end of the cold-war, "The flush of euphoria...must be tempered with the knowledge that while the prospect of a horrific, global war has receded, new threats and dangers - harder to define and more difficult to track - have gathered on the horizon" [2]. Regional, state, and substate actors will pursue their goals, sometimes in conflict with US objectives. Many of these competitors are learning to avoid our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. Smart competitors will challenge the US asymmetrically by avoiding direct military confrontation, since such confrontation tends to cater to our traditional war-fighting abilities. Small-scale conflicts with the US will likely increase in this age of expanding fragmentation and polarization due to ethnic, religious, and economic friction between and within polities.

The United States' willingness to maintain a military establishment on the scale required by the Cold War has passed, as evidenced by continuing force structure and budget reductions*. Our military today finds itself in an unenviable position: while expected to retain the capability to deal with two near-simultaneous Major Regional Conflicts (MRCs), we must also contend with ongoing "presence" and "engagement"

* The 050 account, which includes nearly all DOD and defense-related expenditures, declined 34% (in FY 97 dollars) between 1987 and 1997. Active force levels from 1986 to 1997 show 35% and 13% reductions in the Army and Marine Corps, respectively, a 48% reduction in Air Force aircraft, and a 37% reduction in Navy ships. [3]

requirements, as well as emerging Smaller-Scale Contingency (SSC) Operations [4] (a subset of MOOTW). SSC operations take many forms, from Humanitarian Assistance to Show-of-Force to Peace Enforcement, and they may be unilateral or multilateral. One thing all SSCs have in common is that they rarely involve direct threats to US vital national interests. Yet they do have a major effect on the US military's resources, readiness, and morale. (In simple monetary terms, DOD spent over \$15 billion in incremental costs from 1992-1996 for the operations in Iraq/Kuwait, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia [5]). Additionally, national prestige is on the line every time our military is involved in any major operation. US difficulties with SSCs may encourage others to challenge the US abroad and at home.

One should ask if the US military can respond more effectively to the challenges it faces given the realities of shrinking resources and a changing geopolitical environment. The National Defense University's 1997 Strategic Assessment discusses the US military's critical need for *flexibility* and *agility* in its approach to missions:

In some cases, agility may require a higher degree of specialization, so that the overall force has maximum agility. Agility will require organizational and cultural changes rather than equipment changes. [6]

Presumably, organizational change may improve operational agility. Improved agility will lead to enhanced mission effectiveness. Does this imply that change for change's sake will enhance effectiveness? Certainly not. Perhaps, however, a change in a specific area, such as in our approach to SSCs, could realize such a benefit without sacrificing the advantages we enjoy today in traditional war-fighting, and it might even free up more resources to maintain and upgrade our war-fighting capabilities. What if we could make such a change

without creating new organizations, substantially changing proven doctrine, spending more money, or restructuring our standing forces? What if such a change dramatically improved mission effectiveness, enhanced long-term combat capabilities, lowered Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO), and reduced Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenditures? What if it involved basically only a change in the way we view and construct command arrangements? In his Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) message, Secretary of Defense Cohen predicts:

Second, our future force will be different in *character*...New operational concepts and organizational arrangements will enable our joint forces to achieve new levels of effectiveness across the range of conflict scenarios.[7]

Our joint and service blueprints for the future, such as Joint Vision 2010 and the QDR, address the need for reducing the military support infrastructure, streamlining, leveraging technology, and other techniques aimed at enhancing military efficiency. Few planners, however, discuss techniques whereby the military can adapt structurally to mission requirements. The QDR addresses the need to exploit the "Revolutions in Military and Business Affairs" (RMA & RBA), and several techniques such as those mentioned above are proposed. Yet scant attention is paid in the QDR to reorganization. Only in reference to the *support* infrastructure does the QDR mention, "...much more fundamental work must be done to radically reengineer our institutions"[8]. Until the US military seriously considers the merits of mission-specific organizational adaptations, little progress will be realized in the overall modernization effort.

C. PURPOSE

This thesis examines US military organizational change as it may be applied to specific SSCs^{*}. It explores the issue of how to economize force and increase effectiveness in SSCs while simultaneously enhancing US war-fighting capabilities. It also evaluates costs and benefits derived from organizational adaptations while capitalizing on current advantages and emerging technologies. The military services devote a great deal of effort to exploring the possibilities of enhanced effectiveness in more-or-less “traditional” war-fighting^{**}. Little consideration has been given, however, to changes in non-traditional threat scenarios, perhaps because new techniques and technologies developed for war-fighting may somehow “spill-over” into the SSC realm. This apparent lack of fundamental reevaluation may be due to the very nature of SSCs, which are characterized by confusing, amorphous, and seemingly uncontrollable environments. Regardless, SSCs must be examined as separate events from traditional “war-fighting” on more than just a doctrinal level.

^{*} The terms “MOOTW, Stability and Support Operations (SASO), Low-Intensity Conflict (LIC), and Peace-Time Contingency Operations (PCOs)” will, for brevity’s sake, be lumped under the acronym “SSC” to denote all operations falling under Joint Pub 3-07’s definition of MOOTW (sub-war) [9] as they pertain to this thesis. Chapter II will further clarify the nature of these operations.

^{**} “Traditional” defined by the nature of the threat and our strategic approach, more so than by the capabilities we employ. Some capabilities, such as Information Operations (IO), may appear non-traditional, yet may be employed in a more-or-less traditional manner (e.g., C2W).

D. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS RESULTS

The use of the GPF with SOF in support (the current role) of specific Smaller-Scale Contingency operations is a serious suboptimization* of US and allied assets. The consequences range from over-expenditure and waste to excessive loss of life to, in some instances, even mission failure. I will identify which SSCs are relevant and the reasons why. In order to test the hypothesis against the backdrop of these SSC missions, a model SOF-based organization will be postulated. This Joint Task Force XXI (JTF-XXI) is one of many possibilities, and is meant for hypothetical examination. The JTF-XXI is based on current SF doctrine and operating procedures, except that it involves US or coalition units instead of guerrilla warfare formations. Since both the current JTF structure and JTF-XXI are grounded in reality, they can be compared objectively.

This thesis examines Operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) in Somalia, December 1992-May 1993, and its resultant effects on the subsequent UNOSOM II efforts. This case is studied because it involves all of the applicable elements of the SSCs espoused as suitable for JTF-XXI, and it serves to highlight current organizational problems. The Army's official After-Action from its Center for Army Lessons Learned describes Restore Hope as:

...a first for the use of US forces in a Humanitarian Assistance role of supporting UN efforts. The term "Humanitarian Assistance" as used here, however, does not fully explain the range of missions that were dictated by the unusual situation that existed in Somalia. With the absence of a legitimate government, and the number of warring factions, military forces were involved in every aspect of the restoration of order from

* The terms "optimization" and "suboptimization" are somewhat subjective. In Chapter II, the definitions of these terms will be clarified as they apply to military operations, especially in view of the fact that all military operations are inherently at least somewhat suboptimal.

limited combat operations to political negotiations and reconstruction of the national infrastructure. [10]

UNITAF was commanded by a US GPF-dominated JTF, was multilateral, and was affected by all the variables impacting SSCs (see Chapter II). SOF was utilized in a traditional, limited and supporting role. Handoff to UN forces was an integral element of the operation. Finally, the operation was recent enough to reflect the impact of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, relatively current MOOTW doctrine, lessons learned from Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm, and several recent domestic and international Humanitarian Assistance efforts.

The case-study will explore successes, suboptimization, and failures and their causes. Emphasis will be placed on the operational (JTF) level, and how its activities affected the components and resultant mission execution at the tactical level. The proposed JTF-XXI will then be applied against Restore Hope in a counter-factual examination. The Restore Hope case-study demonstrates how the JTF and its components performed sub-optimally in specific, mission-essential tasks (as derived from the CINCCENT's mission statement), and how this performance contributed to later UN failures during UNOSOM II. The examination will demonstrate that an organizational change involving a SOF-led JTF would have stood a much better chance of optimal performance in Somalia, and might even have averted subsequent military and political disasters. The JTF-XXI model will then be compared to the current structure through a counter-factual application to Operation Restore Hope. Finally, some of the more

important implications of such a shift, and what requirements it would entail, are presented.

This thesis is intended to provide the basis for debate and reform of how the US military structures itself in pursuit of future SSCs. Without such reform, technological advances will provide only incremental advantages to our forces, often to be matched or surpassed by future opponents. The JTF-XXI structure (or one similar) is vastly superior to the current GPF-based ad-hoc JTF in both mission effectiveness and efficiency. Shifting to this structure would have minimal effects upon either segment of our military, and it would take maximum advantage of specific capabilities without extensive retraining or reorganization at the component level.

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10. *Operation Restore Hope: Lessons Learned Report, 3 December 92-4 May 93*, Center for Army Lessons Learned, p 10.

II. THEORY

A general is just as good or just as bad as the troops under his command make him.

General Douglas MacArthur [1]

A. SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCY (SSC) OPERATIONS

SSC operations are known by many terms. The acronym "SSC" itself is most recently used in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and is not as yet a recognized DOD term*. The QDR defines SSC operations as those operations that:

...encompass the full range of joint military operations beyond peacetime engagement activities but short of major theater warfare and include: show-of-force operations, interventions, limited strikes, noncombatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief . [3]

SSCs are a sub-set of the more encompassing term "Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)". MOOTW includes all military activities conducted short of war[4]. In addition to the example SSC activities provided by the QDR, MOOTW may also involve nation assistance, counterinsurgency, freedom of navigation, counterdrug, protection of shipping, US civil support, and others. Operations in war primarily involve attacking, defending, and blockading. [5] Service definitions are similar to DOD's, although the Army recently published FM 100-20, "Stability and Support Operations" (SASO) in an attempt to clarify the nature of MOOTWs. (While this thesis may at times draw on service doctrine where it is useful, it will throughout remain joint in terminology and approach.)

* The term "Smaller-Scale Contingency" does not appear in Joint Pub 1-02, "DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms". Neither, however, does "Major Regional Conflict"(MRC). [2]

SSC Operations may call for major contingency forces to be deployed on short notice. Situations requiring such an effort do not yet rate an "MRC-sized" response, yet are still considered important enough to commit to *en masse* (i.e., Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, etc.). SSCs may occur due to failures in diplomatic or military peacetime engagement efforts, and are usually an attempt to forestall situations that might call for a much larger commitment at a later date. SSCs should not be classified, however, by a certain level of troop commitment nor by the reaction time involved. These operations can involve just about any military activity. The US and its allies decide how much and what type forces are to be used, and the funding needed to confront SSC crises.

B. GENERAL VARIABLES IN MOOTW/SSC OPERATIONS

From the National Command Authority to the rifle squad, decisions are daily made that will affect the outcome of any military mission. In MOOTW, the decisions made at lower levels often have a much greater impact than in conventional warfare. For simplicity's sake, variables affecting military decision-making have been broken down into two distinct classes: dependent and independent variables. These variables are classified according to the viewpoint of the COMJTF and his subordinate commanders during mission execution. Dependent variables are those which the COMJTF can directly influence during mission execution, independent variables are those which he cannot directly influence. The most important dependent variable is "mission execution", and all efforts are focused to that end.

In a "conventional" combat environment, the critical independent variables tend to be somewhat limited to Mission, Enemy, Terrain and Weather, Troops, and Time available

(METT-T). Other variables such as governmental and non-governmental agencies and the media have an effect, but this effect is felt more at the strategic than the operational and tactical levels. The variable interaction becomes more complicated as the environment slides down the spectrum into the MOOTW realm, changing the relative weight of the independent variables as opposed to war. DOD's Joint Publication on MOOTW emphasizes:

MOOTW encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These operations can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power. To understand MOOTW, it is useful to understand how. All military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, **political considerations permeate all levels** and the military may not be the primary player.[6]

SSCs such as those conducted in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia present an extremely complex and involved set of independent variables, given the mix of combat and non-combat operations and complex mission requirements. In an SSC, there may be no one true "enemy". Instead, the US commander may be confronted with several different factions or "actors", with or without positive leadership, who may at different times and for varying reasons attempt to interfere with US and coalition forces.

In operations involving coalition partners, the partners' behavior becomes as important as that of US forces, even though other nations' agendas may not exactly match those of the United States. The operational environment accounts for factors such as climate, terrain, and disease, as well as political, economic, religious, or ethnic/tribal

friction in the area of operations. In MOOTW, the media may be allowed or encouraged to roam virtually unrestrained, and the interplay between the media and domestic or international opinion is dramatic and immediate. The military will find itself intermingled with and at times reliant upon a host of governmental and non-governmental agencies. These agencies may prove of great benefit or hindrance to military operations. Either way, their presence is critical and assured, and leaders at all levels must understand and work with them. Finally, US doctrine for MOOTW is comprehensive and useful for commanders at all levels. DOD and the services have invested a great deal of effort, and it shows. However, doctrine is only of use if it is read, understood, practiced, and if the force has the abilities to apply it.

C. CRITICAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CIVs)

Of all the independent variables, the military is able to exercise positive control over three (besides doctrine), and these only prior to mission initiation except for in extreme, protracted situations. Once an SSC operation looms imminent, DOD (specifically the SecDef, Joint Chiefs, and regional CINC) possesses a great deal of latitude (varying according to the political situation) in determining:

- 1) Selected forces (components & type units)
- 2) Designated Commander(s)
- 3) Staff composition

These are the Critical Independent Variables (CIVs) upon which this thesis rests. DOD cannot decide whether or not it will support a Presidential decision to prosecute an SSC operation with military force. In turn, the Joint Chiefs and regional CINC can rarely force

the NCA to clarify what may be a confusing, somewhat contradictory policy. The Department of State retains executive agency status in peacetime engagement operations not involving combat units, with the Chief of Mission (COM) in charge on the ground; however, SSCs involving combat units fall under DOD purview [7]. (In both cases, there must exist a high level of cooperation between DOD and State.) Once the mission has been framed by the CINC (with JCS concurrence), the military's best opportunity to influence conduct of the operation rests in the Critical Independent Variables. The military is generally able to decide what type of forces are most appropriate and who will command and staff these forces. The NCA holds the veto in these decisions, but except for in extreme circumstances (such as SECDEF Aspin's refusal to send armor to Somalia), the military has a great deal of latitude as long as total numbers stay within the force cap.

In an emerging SSC time and resource constraints imposed by the crisis time-line do not allow planners to consider drastically different options, and senior commanders entrusted with the mission and thousands of soldiers' lives will not take chances. The CIVs represent the military's last and best opportunity to influence the progression of the mission. Once the force is allocated and initiates deployment, it will operate within the constraints of not only the other independent variables (over which it exercises essentially no control), but also within the constraints of the commanders' and staffs' experience and abilities and within the training, experience, and capabilities of the JTF's components. Therefore, alternative options regarding force structures applied to particular SSC operations must be addressed, developed, and practiced in advance if any appreciable improvements are to be realized at the execution level. In order to make headway, major

force types must be evaluated in relation to their strengths and weaknesses and particular MOOTW mission requirements.

D. MEASURES OF OPTIMIZATION

Prior to comparing force structures, a standard form of measurement must be developed and applied to each structure. The term "Measure of Effectiveness (MOE)" is most commonly used in reference to military operations. However, since "effectiveness" means "having an intended or expected effect" or "producing a strong impression or response"[8], it is not a very useful term when comparing different organizations which would presumably all produce the intended effect, at least to some extent. Therefore, this thesis will use the term "optimization" or, conversely, "suboptimization", when discussing organizational capabilities and performance. Optimization is a slippery term, meaning many things to many people. One dictionary defines "optimize" as:

- 1) To make as perfect or effective as possible;
- 2) To make the most of.[9]

Therefore, any situation in which the military is not "as effective as possible", nor "makes the most of" its potential is an example of suboptimization. One would of course now pose the question: Does any military organization ever truly optimize? Certainly not, for there is always room for strategic or performance-related improvement. Given this fact, that no organization will ever do as well as it could, the issue now becomes one of comparing different organizations' potential for performance. Since human beings will always make mistakes, one must discern if the failure was truly an individual's mistake, or if the system in which he operates and by which he was trained has set him up for failure.

Additionally, all individuals and organizations are limited by their experience, training, and preparations. Simply put, one would not put a tank crew on the bridge of a destroyer and expect the crew members to avoid accidents simply by reading the ship's manuals and working very hard.

Different organizations and individuals, then, have different capabilities to pursue the objectives of any MOOTW operation. An organization designed and trained to address each of the component principles of MOOTW should have a greater potential to succeed. While Joint Pub 3-07 addresses certain "Principles of MOOTW", the Army's more recent Field Manual 100-20's "Principles of Stability Operations" are more specific and better suited to SSCs. The first criteria to be used, therefore, in defining "optimization" is the organization's capabilities to provide comprehensive command and control in the context of these principles, and the individual soldier's capabilities to apply the principles at the tactical unit level. FM 100-20's seven principles [10] are:

- 1) Primacy of the Political Instrument
- 2) Unity of Effort
- 3) Adaptability
- 4) Legitimacy
- 5) Patience and Perseverance
- 6) Restraint
- 7) Security

This first measure of optimization (the seven principles) involves direct mission application and often its ultimate success or failure, and in this general context is useful as a measure of an organization's potential to "optimize" in SSCs. In specific situations, such as Operation Restore Hope, this general measure must be refined by examining critical

specified tasks. The two measures work as building blocks to examine both potential and actual performance, providing a more comprehensive picture of organizational capabilities. The next two measures of optimization have less affect on the mission *per se*, but measure how the civilian leadership and populace view SSCs, our government's ability to continue supporting such activities, and the effect of these operations on the military services who conduct them. These indicators of optimization are:

- 1) Funding needed for SSC operations and the subsequent effect on the force.
- 2) Long-term military effects of frequent SSC operations.

Without conducting full case-studies, two examples will here be briefly introduced to illustrate what may constitute the two ends of the optimization issue. These are benchmark cases, and are only meant to bound the debate and provide somewhat more concrete examples of optimization and suboptimization.

The United States' involvement in Vietnam cost billions of dollars and thousands of US and Vietnamese lives per year. Our involvement in Indochina profoundly affected not only the US military, but also the entire US political and cultural outlook. Victory was not achieved, thus further increasing the ultimate cost of involvement. Although Vietnam has been studied thousands of times from political, strategic, humanitarian, and tactical viewpoints, the one common denominator is that we paid a great cost and still failed. Vietnam is the starkest example we have of US suboptimization.

In the early 1980s, the US was faced with another Communist-backed insurgency, this time in El Salvador. Determined not to repeat mistakes made in Vietnam, the US effort remained small, with only 55 permanent advisors and about \$500 million a year

invested. Early Salvadoran excesses caused some political challenges in the US, but ultimate victory was achieved, and at a very small cost to the US. The war in El Salvador represents the optimized end of the spectrum. While neither of these operations was perfect, and the situations were in many respects dissimilar, they are not meant to be compared head-to-head, nor with operations in Somalia.

E. SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES: WHAT MISSIONS?

Some may go so far as to argue that SOF should command and control (C2) all types of MOOTW[11], or as many foreign "sub-war" activities as possible[12]. Current doctrine leaves all large-scale operations (involving forces such as called for by an SSC) to the GPF. This portion of the thesis pinpoints which types of operations lend themselves to SOF C2, which are better left to the GPF, and why. Figure 2.1 (Range of Military Operations) gives examples of typical operations falling within the SSC realm. While not exhaustive, the list allows for some analysis. Those operations that are highlighted, and others which may be similar in scope and objective, are those which are at issue. Those which are not highlighted are usually suitably allocated.

The US military is well structured, at least for the near-term, for many of its activities. Obvious examples of suitable structuring include most wartime activities, especially in operations with fairly clear-cut political and military objectives, such as Operations Just Cause or Desert Storm. While improvements should and will result from technical innovations in war-fighting, few would dispute US supremacy in large scale combat operations. Many smaller-scale combat operations are also suitably allocated in most instances. Some of the strike and reconnaissance operations (such as "Show of

force/raid/strike/NEO”) are allocated to GPF forces or SOF, depending on the situation. Counterterrorism, to include counterproliferation, are usually assigned to SOF. Both of these categories are similar in that they are of extremely limited duration and scope, and objectives are clear and theoretically easily attainable.

At one end of the spectrum are fairly “routine”, lower-priority tasks such as Foreign Internal Defense (FID), counterdrug operations, etc. While these tasks sometimes do not start out as routine or low priority, they are at some point more easily categorized as to which agency should have oversight and what level of effort is required.

Military Operations		General US Goals	Examples
C O M B A T	War	Fight & Win	Large-Scale Conventional/ Unconventional Warfare Attack/Defend/Blockade
	N O N C O M B A T	Deter Aggression & Resolve Conflict	Show of Force/Raid/Strike/NEO Counterterrorism <u>Peace Enforcement</u> <u>Peacekeeping</u> <u>Counterinsurgency</u> <u>Nation Assistance</u>
		Promote Peace	<u>Humanitarian Assistance</u> Foreign Internal Defense Counterdrug Freedom of Navigation US Civil Support

Figure 2.1- Range of Military Operations. After Ref. [13]

As they tend to occur in relatively permissive environments and are long term, they allow the US government more latitude to experiment and shift approaches as necessary. Some are GPF dominated, some are SOF, and many are mixed. While some may debate counterdrug strategy, for example, its nature may make it less urgent that the best C2 strategy be found early-on.

The highlighted tasks in the center of the chart include most currently recognized SSCs that are addressed by this thesis. They include Peace Operations (Peace Enforcement and Peacekeeping), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Nation Assistance, and Humanitarian Assistance. These operations are the ones that are the most difficult for the US military. Military means are often seconded to and in support of diplomatic or political means; satisfactory solutions are difficult to obtain, and the "100-hour-war" mentality is not only impractical but usually counterproductive. Similarities and differences emerge when one defines each operation:

1. Peace Enforcement - Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
2. Peacekeeping - Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease-fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
3. Counterinsurgency - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.
4. Nation Assistance - Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises, or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations.
5. Humanitarian Assistance - Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great

damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. [14]

Peace Operations often will involve the largest contingency forces, especially in the initial stages, and also involve the greatest perceived risk to US and allied forces. Longer-term missions, such as the MFO-Sinai mission, tend to become more static and gradually require fewer forces. Counter-insurgency, as most recently practiced in El Salvador, calls for a minimal number of US forces well-situated to provide maximum exploitation of host-nation assets. While US forces will sometimes come under fire, the emphasis is on assistance provided to the friendly government. Nation Assistance may sometimes overlap with COIN or Humanitarian Assistance, but the level of combat unit commitment is normally much less than that of Combat Support and Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) assets. Finally, Humanitarian Assistance is normally the most permissive and CS/CSS heavy environment. However, as recent operations in Northern Iraq, Bosnia, Haiti, and especially Somalia demonstrate, multiple tasks and missions may occur simultaneously within the context of one operation. The military tries to cleanly categorize each type of operation. While these operations have been ordered in this context, the order itself is largely irrelevant. Of more relevance is the distinctiveness of this middle subset of operations as opposed to the largely war-fighting operations at one end and the largely peaceful operations at the other. The reality of this middle subset is that, whatever the force structure, it must be capable of pursuing the principle non-war-fighting mission

while retaining the capabilities to engage in intensive intelligence gathering and combat operations without sacrificing legitimacy.

Therefore, what the US military needs in these SSCs is a highly flexible, robust force structure capable of smoothly and rapidly transitioning back and forth between combat and non-combat functions. The emphasis throughout, however, is on peaceful resolution of the crisis without violent flare-ups. This resolution does not just occur at the diplomatic or flag grade level, but at the individual soldier level. Consequently, the more capable and flexible the tactical unit, the greater the chance of positive resolution at low cost in blood and treasure.

F. SMALLER-SCALE CONTINGENCIES: WHICH UNITS?

Now that specific missions have been identified for review, the next logical question surfaces: Who is best suited to provide C2 for each? In all fairness, if a Humanitarian Assistance operation (e.g., disaster relief) is to be performed in a benign environment, a CSS command structure, such as a Corps Support Command (COSCOM), could potentially provide the most economical C2. On the other hand, if an operation called for manning of static guard posts and reporting military movement, such as those in the Sinai or Macedonia, then a pure GPF structure would be most appropriate. SSC operations that, through their complexity of objectives and approach, call for a mix of units, are those which bear consideration for reevaluation.

The process of evaluation of command structures for C2 suitability for SSCs could be a long and laborious process. One could potentially evaluate each type of organization within each branch of service as compared to each mission. The end result would,

however, confirm two main points. First of all, if the potential for combat operations exists, however remote, the prudent individual would provide a combat arms organization to control all activities on the given operation. While CS/CSS units are fully capable of defending themselves from limited assault, they are designed, manned, and equipped to provide support. If asked to do much more, one will see a great decrease in that organization's performance.

In practice, the list of C2 contenders is restricted to ground maneuver combat arms. Two of these types of organizations are the currently approved solution. The General Purpose Force Infantry and Armor forces from the Army and USMC have for many years provided MOOTW and wartime C2. Organizational size has varied, from Field Army to battalion level, depending on the situation. Most recently, the Army Corps or Division and the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) have been used for SSCs. These organizations are accustomed to C2 of large combat forces and their logistical requirements. The staffs are large and robust, and subordinate units are well-accustomed to working within the hierarchical GPF structure.

The other organization, however, is one that would not have been proposed even a decade ago. Special Operations Forces have long been viewed as either renegades intent on breaking the rules or as small bands capable only of the highly specialized *coup de main* and therefore unsuited to employment in the main theater of operations. To many extents, operations in Panama, the Persian Gulf, and Haiti have dispelled this notion. Perhaps, while still and forevermore too small to conduct a large SSC unilaterally, SOF could use

its much-touted force multiplying capabilities in conjunction with other US units to exponentially improve the performance of all concerned.

G. JTF-XXI

1. Concept

US Special Operations Forces are wide-ranging and as diverse in nature as the rest of the military. No other force possesses such a variety of capabilities spread amongst as many organizations, while still tying them together under one parent command (USSOCOM). Army Special Operations Forces (by far the largest) is composed of Rangers, Special Forces, Special Operations Aviation, Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations, and Detachment Delta. The Navy fields SEAL Teams and Special Boat Units, and the Air Force provides fixed and rotary wing aviation and Special Tactics personnel (rescue and combat control).

Command and Control organizations are no less varied. The Army's Special Operations Command (USASOC) oversees the Special Forces Command, the 75th Ranger Regiment, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), and the Special Operations Support Command (USASOSC). Within Special Forces Command, five active and two National Guard SF Groups support the five regional CINCs. The Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) and the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) command their respective elements, while the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) is a national asset under USSOCOM's oversight.

Each regional CINC also boasts a robust SOF C2 capability in its Theater Special Operations Command (SOC). The COMSOC is the principal Special Operations (SO) advisor to the CINC and, as the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC), he exercises OPCON of assigned forces and attached SOF [15]. The SOC is a unified subordinate command, and is well accustomed to the conduct of joint operations (albeit within the "SO" context) in peacetime and war. COMSOC's are normally O-7s with a wealth of experience. Their joint staffs contain a mix of both conventional and special operations personnel. The SOC is capable of conducting simultaneous wartime and peacetime operations. The COMSOC can forward deploy as a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) while a rear detachment provides continuity of peacetime Special Operations [16].

2. The SOC

The proposed JTF-XXI model is based on the theater SOC* . While the SOC is not nearly as large as a corps or MEF headquarters, it would be an ideal organization to use as the base for an SSC JTF. It is already joint, is forward deployed, is closely linked to the CINC, and is already culturally and regionally oriented. Additionally, size is not necessarily a virtue. At one point the JTF in Somalia numbered over 700 personnel [18]. Coordination in such a large organization must certainly be demanding and somewhat inefficient. Since the forward-deployed SOC would be the JTF instead of the JSOTF, the next major SOF command would assume the JSOTF role. This would not be difficult, as a

* Using the SOC to form a standing JTF is not a new concept. CINCPAC's JTF 510 is a SOC rapid-deployment JTF designed to forward deploy, liase, assess the situation, report to the CINC and, if the situation is of a manageable scope, conduct operations using US and coalition forces.[17] JTF 510 is an excellent departure point for the JTF-XXI development.

JSOTF in JTF-XXI would only be established for truly "special" (e.g., "black") operations. An example of such a need might be seen in operations similar to JSOC's activities in Mogadishu against Aidid in the fall of 1993.

What is truly revolutionary about this concept, however, is that separate component commands as we currently view them would be eliminated. The hierarchical military organization is, for the time being, very effective in large-scale combat operations. However, it necessitates a highly compartmentalized view of operations. The traditional military approach is to separate the battlefield geographically, assigning subordinate component commands a piece of real estate for which they are responsible, with a requirement to coordinate with neighboring units present only when such coordination is absolutely necessary. The higher headquarters retains overall responsibility to ensure its subordinates' efforts are focused. Each organization, typically, acts based on the higher commander's intent and the tactical commanders' good judgment.

This traditional, pyramidal organization is poorly adapted to SSCs, which are viewed by many officers and soldiers alike as strange, uncontrollable situations where the "other side" always has the initiative. This feeling encourages failure-avoidance, not success-seeking activities. What is needed is an organizational approach that is network-based. Such a network organization would be smaller, could transmit information more rapidly, and could react to changes with greater speed and flexibility. In many cases, such an organization could be proactive instead of reactive in the SSC environment. A network is flatter and more decentralized than the conventional C2 hierarchy. It relies on the initiative and abilities of subordinates and an effective flow of information and eliminates

several command layers, thus encouraging communication between subordinate commanders. Since the overall commander cannot coordinate everything, subordinates communicate directly while the commander is kept informed and can veto as necessary. In order to be effective, of course, the network must have the requisite raw materials:

- 1) Upper-echelon commanders and staffs that are organized to facilitate the process (especially at the CINC and JTF).
- 2) Reliable, capable, initiative-filled subordinates.
- 3) Information systems that are capable of keeping all informed.
- 4) A willingness by all to assume a higher level of responsibility, with all attendant risks.

3. JTF-XXI Component Directorates

Given such a network based on the SOC, the next step is to look at current component commands. In a network, major component commands are redundant and inhibit information flow vertically and horizontally. They also stifle initiative and joint service cooperation at the tactical level. When tactical units are assigned or OPCON to separate components, they remain loyal to those components and somewhat competitive with others. JTF-XXI would eliminate component commands, instead integrating these functions into the JTF structure. Service components would be integrated into the JTF staff sections as "component directorates". Commanders of subordinate units would be dual-hatted, much as the Direct Support artillery battalion commander for an infantry brigade in the Army is also the Brigade Fire Support Officer. He does not give up command of his unit, yet at the same time becomes more closely integrated into the

planning cycle. Not only would a command layer be eliminated, but the smaller JTF with collocated component directorates would forcibly enhance communication and cooperation. For instance, intelligence sharing would be near real-time in an integrated J2, and dissemination would be immediate both to and from the tactical units.

Such a physical consolidation is not without precedent, and usually proves quite effective. When Gen. Sir Gerald Templer arrived in Malaya in 1952 at the height of the Malayan Emergency, he was presented with security forces spread out all over Kuala Lumpur. He created a new Joint Emergency Headquarters, concentrating his Deputy Director of Operations, Secretary for Defence, Police Commissioner, intelligence activities, Army, Navy, and RAF, all in one facility in Kuala Lumpur, thus creating "jointness" and serving to decrease parochial behavior [19]. By being in close physical proximity, security officials were more able to work together and share information, and their effectiveness dramatically increased.

Given a single JTF without separate components, one can now see how the SOC becomes the base for the JTF. Components bring their staffs, some of whom are integrated into the JTF "directorates" providing it with the requisite manpower and staff expertise, and some (assigned to tactical units) remain part of the new structures formed at the tactical level. These tactical units are the most important part of the organization, for they provide the organization with its true enhanced capabilities. Tactical units would be split into two types: Contingency Task Units (CTUs) and Sector Task Units (STUs).

4. Sector Task Units

Sector Task Units are the fundamental tactical building block of the JTF-XXI structure. The STU is designed and trained to assume responsibility for a geographical sector on a long-term basis. For example, the STU would assume responsibility for a particular town and its surrounding countryside or a collection of villages. Parallels can be drawn between the STU mission and recent Special Forces operations in rural Haiti. The important difference, however, is that the STU reigns supreme in its sector, answerable only to its chain of command, unless otherwise directed by its chain of command. This is important because, as we shall see, CTUs operating in the STU's Area of Operations (AO) may be commanded by equal or higher ranking individuals, who may inadvertently upset long-term operations in the sector in pursuit of a short-term objective. This is the point where the issue of what type unit constitutes the STU is important, given that the entire JTF operational area will eventually be broken down into STU sectors.

STUs must be self-contained organizations capable of conducting long-term, independent operations, often far from other friendly forces. They are joint/unified teams, capable of integrating CA, PSYOP, MPs, Infantry, Airmen, Marines, Engineers, military coalition partners, or any other organization needed. Their mission would call for them to interact with indigenous government and security forces (if present), various US and international governmental and non-governmental agencies, ethnic clan leaders, other US and coalition military units (CTUs and other STUs), and the people themselves. The STUs would have the responsibility to develop, staff, and implement local plans in support of the JTF's mission. The STU needs to be flexible enough to shift smoothly between

humanitarian and combat operations, and would need to supervise programs as diverse as road construction, preventive medicine, disarmament, and law enforcement training. Language proficiency, cultural orientation, maturity, and applicable experience are a must. The STU must be capable of absorbing and controlling major combat, combat support, or combat service support operations in their sector without loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The STU must have the capability to maintain communications flow with higher, even if higher is hundreds of miles away, and must take the initiative in the obvious absence of specific guidance.

Each type of SSC might call for different activities on the part of the STUs, but ultimately, the skills described above will be needed, and training time is usually minimal, calling for a standing force capable of these operations. Intelligence gathering is critical in MOOTW, especially since technical means are extremely limited in this environment. The best form of intelligence is that provided voluntarily to a trained, aware American walking the streets, known as a friend to the people, who knows how to exploit the information and can react to it immediately.

This list of characteristics for the STU appears daunting. Certainly, one would not ask a Ranger or SEAL platoon, aviation crew, Civil Affairs, or PSYOP team to assume such responsibilities. Only one organization could provide up to fifty-four such STUs per region plus organic command and control apparatuses without blinking an eye. US Army Special Forces Groups are specifically designed for this type of endeavor. Army FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations, states:

SF is an unconventional combat arm. It combines at the lowest tactical level the functions performed by several conventional branches of the Army. In effect it is a *combined arms* branch.[20]

Operational Detachments Alpha (ODAs) would provide the STUs, with Operational Detachments Bravo (ODB) and Charlie (ODC) providing successive levels of support and C2 as necessary. ODAs are well-accustomed to conducting such operations, and thrive on them. While the ODB (SF company) and ODC (SF battalion) are available and established for C2 of the ODAs, they are to some extent not needed by the ODAs once deployed. This both facilitates the network organization (by not adding another layer) and frees up these headquarters to supervise other operations as needed (such as CTUs). In fact, the ODBs are organized to conduct operations of their own, actually bringing an SF Group's complement of maneuver or liaison elements to 63. Additionally, ODAs are designed redundantly (to allow them to split in two if necessary), nearly doubling the area of coverage. Special Forces, then, would be the tactical base for JTF-XXI, at least in the initial stages of an operation. In some cases, as the situation stabilizes, some sectors could be gradually handed off to other GPF or non-US military organizations, freeing up SOF for redeployment or other missions. The use of ODAs as the base for the STU necessitates, however, a commitment on the part of CTUs in support of the SF teams.

5. Contingency Task Units

The other critical half of the JTF tactical base is the CTU. The CTU is a flexible, composite, task-organized unit. It more closely resembles the Task Force than an organic

unit (in the more traditional Task Force form). Today, most Task Forces habitually train and operate together. In the JTF-XXI, a CTU would truly be formed ad-hoc on a mission-specific basis. Numerous missions can be identified ahead of time requiring relatively long-term CTU operations. For instance, a CTU charged with supervision of regional relief supply convoy operations might need a Military Police (MP) company, a heavy truck battalion, a road construction engineer battalion, a PSYOP team, and a CA team on a long-term basis. These elements would form a CTU as long as its mission remains viable, at which time the CTU would either move to another region, be split up to perform other operations, or redeploy to home station. In another instance, an infantry rifle battalion with aviation lift support and vehicles might form another CTU. This CTU might have one company on Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status in support of regional STUs, while the other companies conduct CTU cordon and search or roadblock operations in a highly contested STU sector. In the case of operations within an STU's area of operations, the CTU would in most cases be under the Operational Control of the STU, or possibly the STU's higher command. CTUs, then, are the ready-reserve of the JTF, able to move to wherever they are needed for particular short-term missions, withdrawing back into more easily supportable compounds between missions.

Many will recognize this division of labor as similar to that used in Vietnam. In this case, however, the STUs have responsibility for nearly all the affected countryside. STUs would develop intelligence and utilize indigenous assets to their maximum capabilities before bringing in CTUs. The typical SFODA would not bring in a CTU unless absolutely necessary, would endeavor to employ it within its capabilities, then release it as quickly as

possible. This is the nature of such semi-autonomous organizations, and thus allows the JTF to husband its scarce CTU resources for high-priority missions. This approach, however, entails a commitment on the military's part to provide a small but extremely diverse and flexible capability to the CTUs. The CTUs will, in many cases, need a full variety of attack and lift aviation, ground mobility (including light and heavy armor), close air support (including fast-movers and AC-130), suitable fixed-wing lift, and maritime capabilities. A full variety of combat, CS, and CSS capabilities are necessary, and real-time communications are critical via satellite communications or evolving computer-related




Figure 2.2 - JTF-XXI Organization

systems. Basically, the JTF will make a large sacrifice in quantity, but must be qualitatively upgraded to compensate. Figure 2.2 graphically displays the proposed JTF-XXI and component C2 relationships. The structure is much smaller and flatter than in a hierarchy. In a hierarchy, as many as five or more levels may separate the COMJTF from the tactical unit. In JTF-XXI, this is reduced to normally no more than three levels. It must be emphasized that this model can certainly be improved upon. The point, however, is to demonstrate the possibilities inherent in such a structural transformation, and to allow




Figure 2.3 - JTF-XXI Communications

comparison to current and recently used GPF-based JTFs. Figure 2.3 graphically displays the JTF-XXI information flow. As in any network, information flows much more freely and rapidly than in a hierarchy. The JTF, C2 Nodes, and sister units all receive information simultaneously. The system can be adjusted, of course, to account for Operational Security (OPSEC) considerations. This is not a departure from Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) initiatives currently under development at USSOCOM and the services. It provides JTF-XXI with the capability to operate as envisioned in this thesis, and is not fundamentally different from how SOF operates today. Information technologies will simply make this process more practicable.

6. C4I in JTF-XXI

The MOOTW environment inevitably stresses the military C4I network. Three major factors create difficulties:

- 1) The sheer number and variety of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make coordination and unity of effort extremely difficult, especially since most NGOs will not take orders from the government.
- 2) The number and variety of coalition military partners in multilateral operations cause problems in communications and strategy implementation.
- 3) Vast distances may be only sparsely (if at all) covered by military forces, stressing communications nets.

The C4I structure must overcome these difficulties. If the COMJTF cannot control his forces, the JTF-XXI would fail. In this context, "Command & Control" must be viewed in a new light. General Purpose Forces view C2 differently from SOF; this is both

a cultural and an operational bias, one which often causes problems in SSCs. GPF forces are accustomed to operating in a relatively close-knit communications net.

Communications at all levels is "near real-time" using satellite communications (SATCOM), cellular technologies, and Frequency Modulation (FM) communications. Digital computer-technologies will in the near-future provide real-time communications. Culturally, the greatest sin at the tactical unit level is to be "out of touch" with higher, even for a few minutes. Consequently, operations are restricted by communications nets and capabilities.

Special Forces, however, have traditionally operated well beyond the bounds of conventional communications nets. Innovations in High-Frequency (HF) communications have resulted, including recent C4I innovations using HF bands. Certainly, SATCOM is a mainstay of SF, but is not completely relied upon due to limited satellite coverage. Reliance on HF has caused SF to develop a different view of communications from that of the GPF. In certain circumstances, communications are used as a command and control mechanism by SF. In general, however, the limited amount of real-time continuous communications has forced the whole organization to rely on the judgment and capabilities of the commander on the ground. The commander back at headquarters cannot possibly control the men on the ground, and the men on the ground know they cannot rely on headquarters. Therefore, all become more reliant upon the commander's intent, and communications become much more of an information passing mechanism, not a controlling one. Such a cultural attitude is perfect for JTF-XXI, where the span of control is so much greater than in a hierarchy. The COMJTF cannot control each STU or CTU

but will receive a great deal of information from them. In turn, his C2 nodes, while more able to control their subordinates, will usually only command by negation. Certainly, some slip-ups will occur, but such mistakes can be mitigated by the composition of the C2 nodes.

C2 nodes in JTF-XXI are the critical link between the JTF and the tactical units. While the JTF will receive information directly from all units, the COMJTF must be conscious of not bypassing his C2 nodes as directives flow back down, except in extreme circumstances. While the COMJTF may be tempted to directly control his STUs and CTUs, he would be missing what is perhaps the greatest advantage he has in his network. While the CTU C2 nodes could be established from just about any organization as the situation dictates, the most important C2 nodes are the regional STU C2 nodes. The STU C2 nodes will control, typically, from 6 to 18 STUs. The best organizations to use are the SF company and battalion headquarters. Each headquarters is designed to control 6 or 18 detachments, respectively, and the experience level at these headquarters is phenomenal. Company commanders are SF Majors with over 12 years commissioned service, and battalion commanders are Lieutenant Colonels with around 16 years service. Staffs are experienced, robust, and more combined-arms in organic makeup than conventional battalions. With liaisons from attached units, either headquarters is fully capable of positively controlling their STUs, as well as any CTUs working in their region.

For the GPF commander, JTF-XXI appears like a high-risk gamble. For the SOF operator, however, it would not look much different from "business as usual". The apparent risk comes from the greater reliance on subordinate commanders and a smaller,

spread out force. While these factors will be discussed presently, such an organization does not surprise those who look toward warfare in the next century, where small groups employing initiative, improved communications, and off-set weapons systems will dominate the battlefield. JTF-XXI (or a variation thereof) can utilize present systems and organizations and be employed right now. The question left to be examined, however, is can it improve upon current operations in the SSC/MOOTW arena?

H. SPECIAL VS. CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN SSC OPERATIONS

The JTF-XXI model, while far from perfect, allows for comparison with the current JTF structure as so often utilized in current MOOTW. The conventional structure and culture will be compared to JTF-XXI in relation to the previously mentioned seven principles of stability operations, financial costs, and long-term effects on the military as a whole. This comparison is "holistic" in outlook, in that it will consider the interplay between the JTF and all layers of command. Each type of force will usually be considered as a whole (JTF HQs plus components) unless otherwise noted.

1. The Seven Principles of Stability Operations

- 1) Primacy of the Political Instrument
- 2) Unity of Effort
- 3) Adaptability
- 4) Legitimacy
- 5) Patience and Perseverance
- 6) Restraint
- 7) Security

"Primacy of the Political Instrument" implies that the purpose of the SSC is to diffuse a tense situation through non-military methods (i.e., informational, economic, and

diplomatic) which could otherwise result in warfare [21]. Obviously, military forces are one of the primary means by which this will be accomplished in this context. Therefore, the COMJTF and his force must be adept at the use of non-forceful instruments, reserving the application of direct force for crises. In MOOTW, a force with experience and training in the use of all four elements of national power will normally outperform that which is well-versed in only one or two. Conversely, when the military instrument prevails, the force with that expertise will prevail. Asking any one force to do it all is not realistic. The GPF is today asked to do it all, yet must still focus on the combat task, and therefore cannot do justice to the MOOTW requirements.

Special Operations Forces, however, are prepared at all levels to fuse these four elements. In describing the activities of one SFODA (376) in Mirebalais, Haiti, in September of 1994, FM 100-25 states, "No other force concentrates mature senior-grade personnel of different specialties focused to theater operations through regional orientation and language ability and capable of influencing all four elements of national power—political, military, economic, and informational"[22]. While the GPF train to standard on core competencies (e.g., attack and defend), Special Forces, CA, and PSYOP are deployed daily to dozens of nations worldwide, where they work closely with ambassadors, foreign troops, police, foreign CA and PSYOP, US and foreign governmental agencies, NGOs, and the press. Such deployments range from 6 weeks to 6 months, and provide invaluable experience to already well-trained personnel. These personnel carry this experience with them as they rise in rank, providing the COMJTF-XXI and his organic staff with superior capabilities in MOOTW.

MOOTW ("stability operations") require an extensive effort toward combining the efforts of the various agencies and military forces involved in an SSC. "Unity of Effort" encourages the coalescing of all instruments of US, coalition, and especially indigenous national power into one cohesive strategy under unified direction.[23] Establishing a unified focus is one of the great challenges facing any COMJTF as he attempts to fuse together a vast, disparate conglomerate of governmental agencies, NGOs, US armed forces, and coalition partners. General Purpose Forces, especially the Army and Marine Corps, are well-practiced at fighting in combined arms teams. Such capabilities, however, are by and large limited to military forces only. Even military combined arms operations do not normally occur below infantry or armor battalion level. Company commanders do not have a staff nor the experience to integrate more than two or three other arms into their operations, and are largely untrained in the integration of non-military or coalition organizations.

Special Forces are recognized as a powerful tool in the unification effort. General Schwarzkopf called SF, "The glue that held the coalition together" after Desert Storm [24]. FM 100-25 observes, "SF are well suited to operate in a joint, combined, or interagency environment. The inherent versatility and flexibility of SF allow commanders to integrate and synchronize their capabilities readily with those of other theater assets"[25]. Special Forces detachments will often forge relationships conducive to such unity that the Commanding General never could. For instance, Joint Commission Observer (JCO) teams in Bosnia were able to monitor and control factions through non-traditional means:

When (indigenous) brigades were mobilizing or beefing up, it wasn't the three-star who could get in to find out what was going on. It was that SF guy who had had a couple of beers with him who could find out what was going on and settle things down.[26]

The US military must exercise a great deal of "adaptability" in MOOTW. It must be creative and agile, able to operate in pursuit of long-term objectives given meager resources while considering the need to adjust to a fluid environment and the disparate needs of a variety of other organizations. [27] General Purpose Forces are extremely agile, but only within certain bounds. The GPF commander prefers overwhelming force before conducting an operation. This is commendable, for war-fighting is not to be taken lightly, and the enemy should never be underestimated. However, larger forces require more transportation and support, and are thus less agile and adaptable. Conventional forces are by nature large as compared to SOF. For instance, the US Army's 82d Airborne Division's smallest force package is the Battalion Task Force, or Division Ready Force (DRF) 1. The DRF-1 numbers between 800 and 900 personnel and contains almost 100 vehicles. In reality, the 82d prefers to deploy a brigade (the Division Ready Brigade) made up of three DRFs and the brigade headquarters. The DRF 1 battalion alone is about the size of an entire SF Group (composed of 54 ODAs).

Special Forces are often forced to operate on the strategic periphery. Soldiers deploy in small groups to remote regions, far from support or assistance. It is difficult for conventional units to conceive of living and operating for months on end with no resupply, no rapid medical evacuation (sometimes days to the nearest hospital), and only a radio transmission once a day as contact with friendly forces. This is not an unconventional

warfare scenario, but daily life for most teams. Detachments and their headquarters can adjust to drastic mission change without faltering. Two recent examples demonstrate the adaptability of Special Operations Forces. In May of 1997, an 11-man SF detachment deployed to the African nation of Sierra Leone for a Light Infantry training mission found the nation embroiled in a coup. The detachment was abruptly tasked to protect American lives and property in the capital of Freetown, and was instrumental in the rescue and evacuation of hundreds of US and foreign military and civilian personnel [28].

In another instance the year prior, SOCEUR was tasked to support the recovery effort for Transportation Secretary Brown's aircraft in Bosnia. The SOC utilized SOF aviation, Special Forces, and Navy SEALs to quickly locate and recover the aircraft and bodies. While the SOCEUR commander was returning to Stuttgart, he was tasked to evacuate noncombatants from war-torn Liberia. The SOCEUR quickly assembled his JTF, including Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Operations personnel and aircraft. 2,115 people from 71 countries were air evacuated from Monrovia to Freetown, Sierra Leone, before the SO portion of the operation was completed and a conventional commander assumed JTF responsibilities.[29]

These are two of many examples of SOF adaptability, and there are certainly many examples of GPF adaptability. However, Special Forces by their nature are less able to physically dominate their environment than their larger conventional brothers, forcing them to innovate and adjust to the realities of a given situation in order to accomplish the mission. Adaptability in MOOTW is more important than pure brute strength, since that strength can rarely be applied without risking a loss of legitimacy.

“Legitimacy” is critical to how the US military is viewed, both at home and abroad. Domestic and international opinion, while somewhat malleable, will ultimately decide whether our military should be involved in a particular SSC operation. Once there, the attitude of the indigenous government, the opposition, and the people will sometimes decide whether the operation is to be a success or failure. The population’s perception of US involvement will be most greatly influenced by individual soldiers’ “correct behavior”. [30]

Many factors affect domestic, international, and indigenous opinion in regard to military involvement in SSCs. One involves the perceived need, another the level and type of military response, and a third the behavior of the forces in-theater. Many people are suspicious of large deployments of combat troops for non war-fighting purposes, and these suspicions tend to be confirmed if fighting breaks out. Additionally, large numbers of troops tend to result in more negative incidents involving indigenous peoples, especially when young troops unfamiliar with the population become bored and frustrated. What initially appeared to be a legitimate action or force can quickly become one that is viewed with distrust by one or all sides. This can be a devastating blow to any MOOTW, especially one involving Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement.

Therefore, a small, culturally and linguistically attuned force can more effectively maintain legitimacy. What is needed in Peace Operations, in addition to standard diplomacy, is an element that can “break down the walls of miscommunication not through diplomacy but through the language of professionalism and discipline” [31].

The true strength of SF is in the maturity and initiative of each soldier (all officers and non-commissioned officers), ensuring that his actions and those of others around him do not jeopardize US and coalition credibility. Special Forces do not deploy to a region once, do their job, then go home. They constantly return, and understand that their individual actions will affect them and their comrades for years to come. The typical GPF service-member will never return to a region, and may naturally therefore be less conscious of long-term effects. Stability operations are usually long-term, frustratingly slow efforts, requiring the highest level of "Patience and Perseverance" on the part of the US military. The military has to be cautious not to make mistakes which might lead to escalation and a wider conflict that the US is trying to prevent.[32]

US General Purpose Forces are trained to deploy, build up force as necessary, and take the offensive whenever possible and destroy the enemy's will and ability to resist. These units can be patient, as long as the end-result can be met in a reasonable amount of time and the forces can return home quickly. However, when the situation cannot be resolved so easily, such as in counterinsurgencies, US troops will become restive and frustrated. This frustration becomes an impediment to the mission when performance suffers and individual soldiers or their commanders make mistakes.

Special Forces are certainly susceptible to these same problems. However, individuals who understand the "big picture" are less likely to lose control, for they know that progress can be very slow. SF regularly conducts FID-like operations, which are by their nature slow and require a great deal of patience. Those familiar with FID will draw many parallels between how FID is conducted and how most SSC operations must be

conducted in order to be successful. Former 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) commander COL (Ret) J.S. "Ranger" Roach recently wrote:

Success in FID has repeatedly been found in compromise between the in-country status quo and the alternative perspective that we represent. Therefore we must identify the central issues, and we must be ready to compromise with host-country forces on the small issues in order to get the central issues accepted (and you often don't win on the central issues the first time you introduce them). We also have to understand the rate of change in-country. Although the pace may feel like slow-motion to us, when it is accelerated too much, the society can fragment, as it did in Iran in the 1970s. Therefore, intelligent compromise and patience are critical virtues in FID.[33]

This explanation of why patience (and adaptability) are important in FID is one of the cornerstones of SF operational policy, and indicates how SOF views MOOTW. This approach goes a long way to explaining SF success in smaller operations such as the war in El Salvador, of which COL Roach was intimately involved throughout the 1980s. Such long-term approach will prevent conflict escalation, rather than accelerate it.

"Restraint" is of the utmost importance when endeavoring to peaceably solve conflict or humanitarian crises. Armed coercion should only be used sparingly and against organizations engaged in violence. The unrestrained use of force threatens the legitimacy of the force, and can cause catastrophic externalities.[34] Several tools are available to the military to impose restraint on its troops. Thorough training, strong leadership and unit discipline, and specific mission guidance (intent) and Rules of Engagement (ROE) all are useful in the attempt to control our own forces. These efforts easily falter, however, under certain circumstances. First, our coalition partners are by and large not trained, led, or disciplined to the same standard, nor is guidance from their national or military leadership

comparable to ours. They may or may not adhere to US or UN ROE, and repercussions of disobedience vary. US troops' restraint varies as well. Training time for SSCs is usually minimal, and discipline from unit to unit definitely varies within the US military. Blanket ROE for an entire JTF can become very complicated, requiring constant updating. Mission guidance, too, changes frequently as the operation evolves, and young soldiers and their junior leaders sometimes have trouble discerning between combat and non-combat activities in this arena. For instance, the Canadian Airborne Regiment's execution of one young Somali and torturing to death of another in 1993 prompted the disbanding of the regiment and a national scandal. The government's official report concluded, "...that the mission went badly wrong: systems broke down and organizational failure ensued"[35]. US and other nations' troops are not blameless in incidents such as these, for losses of restraint are surprisingly common in such operations, though rarely so extreme.

The presence of Special Forces-led STUs, with their inherent capabilities and oversight responsibilities, would prevent many such incidents in the future. SF become not only the COMJTF's eyes and ears, but his executors of policy and strategy. STUs would have the command responsibility for their sectors, making incidents far less likely to occur.

Finally, the "Security" of the force must be ever-present in the minds of all who participate in, command, and direct SSC operations. The apparently benign nature of many such operations tends to lull our forces into a false sense of security. However, just such an environment is what a disruptive or anti-US element might exploit by striking at US forces. [36] SSC forces are extremely vulnerable to disruptive terrorist and guerrilla-style attack. The 1983 Marine barracks and 1996 Khobar Towers bombings tend to

greatly disrupt MOOTW and even cause them to fail. Initiatives to improve the US anti- and counter-terrorism efforts (known collectively as “combating terrorism”) are being instituted at the Joint Staff with the establishment of the J-34 deputy directorship, and related cells at the regional CINCs. Such efforts are meant to improve force protection capabilities at the JTF level. “Force protection has arrived as an organizational concept at the JTF level”[37] is touted due to these initiatives, which are intended to push force protection equipment and techniques from the top down.

While the top-down approach is certainly useful, the best way to focus force protection is at all levels simultaneously with emphasis at the tactical level. Special Forces are well trained at force protection. Their background is combined arms in nature, giving them a solid foundation in physical (tactical) defense. Most receive anti-terrorism and anti-surveillance training, and repeated deployments into high-risk regions encourage individuals to hone these skills. Many SF soldiers, including all Detachment Commanders, have training in Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection for force-protection purposes. For SF, force protection goes well beyond their perimeter into the community around them.* This “extended” force protection effort is ongoing for SF teams, and would naturally extend as an umbrella to encompass all friendly elements working within an STU’s area. As evidenced by the Khobar Towers incident, however, the best force protector is the commander himself, for everyone else is simply an advisor. Combining

* The author served as a Force Protection coordinator for a sensitive US military installation in a high-risk country in South America in 1993. My most important asset was a combination of interagency/intermilitary coordination with indigenous counterparts and a subtle yet effective early-warning net established within the civilian community itself. I know of one specific example in which a potential threat to US personnel was neutralized thanks to this net.

standing, proven force-protection capabilities with the authority to respond immediately to threats at the tactical level will be far more effective than oversight cells at the strategic level. Large concentrations of troops barricaded in sprawling compounds offer lucrative targets to agitators and terrorists; small pockets of active, culturally engaged and situationally aware experts will offer poor targets and may actually root out the causes and sources of such attacks before they can occur.

2. The Effect of SSC Operations on the US Military

SSCs certainly drain funds from service budgets; operations in Somalia cost the US taxpayer over \$2.2 billion [38] not including the replacement costs for destroyed aircraft, equipment, and long-term health and death benefits for casualties and their families. Certainly this does not compare to an MRC, but does affect the military's ability to train and modernize. Suffice it to say that all would benefit from lower incremental costs as long as mission performance does not suffer.

The third measure of optimization considers the long-term effects on the individual service-members and on the services as a whole. A high SSC-related PERSTEMPO affects the morale, welfare, and retention of service-members. While there exists some debate as to whether or not high PERSTEMPO affects retention, poor retention of trained, experienced service-members certainly affects the services' combat capabilities.

One must also consider the organizations' abilities to succeed in war-fighting given a high OPTEMPO. Here, again, one may debate how SSC participation affects unit combat capabilities. Exercising command and control of the deployed organization may to some extent enhance staff coordination and synchronization capabilities. However, at

least at the tactical level a unit must constantly practice its war-time missions, for skills grow rusty when not constantly used. A soon-to-be-released Army medical study on the effects of peacekeeping operations in Bosnia is reported to indicate a major drop in combat readiness, morale, and soldier effectiveness, especially when units are deployed for long periods (over six months)[39]. The drudgery of most SSC-related tasks tends to dull the fighting edge of individuals and combat units, putting them at risk if an MRC explodes without proper retraining time. One Military Police non-commissioned officer who was interviewed after eight months in Bosnia said:

The repetition kept getting worse and worse...the same thing day in and day out, wore us down. Morale in my battalion, in the end, was terrible. Most soldiers didn't do the jobs they were trained to do. No one was motivated. People started slacking off; they didn't pay attention to details. Everyone looked for the easy way out. [40]

The subject of the effects of MOOTW on military forces is very large, one to which an entire thesis could be devoted. While in different aspects the organizations involved may both benefit and suffer from participation in these operations, the overall effect on the military's abilities to wage war are degraded by continual involvement in MOOTW, especially SSCs. As Rod Paschall put it:

While one unit is deployed, a similar unit is training and preparing to deploy as the first unit's replacement, and a third unit, just returned from the mission, has the bulk of its personnel on long-delayed leaves or is reorganizing or retraining for the next mission. [41]

This force-wide effect is negligible as long as the numbers are small, but it expands rapidly as the numbers increase. SSCs are not war-fighting, even when they include some combat.

The time and resources expended on SSCs are better spent on training and modernization.

This is not a novel view. Gen. Sir Peter Inge, the British Defense Staff Chief, recently commented in reference to so-called peace operations:

The prevalence of these operations can have a very great impact on our ability to fight wars. Skills (are lost) which may take years to redevelop, not just at the tactical level but at the strategic planning level as well.[42]

Service members and their families are usually the first Americans to be affected by large contingency missions. The most serious effect is felt when service members become sick, are wounded, or are killed. Quite simply put, the more personnel, vehicles, ships, and aircraft deployed to an area of operations, the more consequent accidents, injuries, and illnesses will result. So the smaller the operation, the lower the casualties. While Americans will accept casualties, especially in war-time, statistical analyses of troops deployed versus non-battle casualties are meaningless to US citizens when coffins come home to family members. Allied casualties also affect optimization. Increasing allied casualties affect our coalition partners' will to stay the course (culture-dependent). Some nations will sustain higher casualties than others, but eventually any government puts its future at risk when costs outweigh the benefits of SSC participation. Casualties suffered by the indigenous population are also detrimental, for they may cause a loss of legitimacy for the SSC military forces in the eyes of both the indigenous peoples and the world. [43] Whether casualties are battle-related or not will make little difference when the operation is proclaimed to be in the best interests of the people it harms. Therefore, any action

producing casualties entails some cost, and must therefore also entail a very great benefit indeed.

I. SUMMARY

The JTF-XXI model as proposed here is only one of many possibilities. The main points stand clear, however. The US military must not treat Smaller-Scale Contingency operations as if they were simply "small wars". In one respect, they are truly specialized operations, in that they require organizations, training, and sometimes equipment that conventional forces alone are incapable of providing. In another respect, they are the most general of all operations, in which case war-fighting is the truly specialized operation. Either way, Special Operations Forces appear to provide the most effective means by which to multiply increasingly limited US and coalition capabilities to react to SSC crises. If the US can continue to throw huge forces at these recurring problems and is willing to accept occasional embarrassment or defeat at the hands of asymmetrical opponents, then there exists no reason to change. However, as events from Somalia and elsewhere demonstrate, we should seriously consider fundamental changes in the way we do business. An examination of events in Somalia and how JTF-XXI might have changed them will serve to focus the debate and demonstrate the capabilities of organizational change.

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III. SOMALIA BEFORE UNITAF

A. INTRODUCTION

Before the 1990s, most American policy-makers did not consider the Horn of Africa to be of great strategic interest to the United States. Other than reports of occasional border wars, little information leaked out as to political situations in this remote region. Certainly, few could have conceived of the area warranting the involvement of thousands of foreign troops and the expenditure of billions of dollars. Why were UN and American soldiers called upon to fight with Somalis in the streets of Mogadishu? What led these people to such a state of conflict that international armed intervention was viewed as the sole means of restoring order and preventing genocide? The roots of this anarchy lie in the ethnic structure of Somalia and in the attempts by General Muhammad Siad Barre to consolidate the Somali state, often in direct conflict with the ethnic makeup of its people.

In 1969 Barre established Scientific Socialism in an attempt to consolidate and unify Somalia. While he made some progress through the 1970s in modernizing Somalia, Barre's use of "Marxist" totalitarianism and manipulations of ethnic and tribal influences failed to maintain the state structure and even contributed to his government's overthrow in 1991 and the ensuing inability of Somalis to unite and establish an effective national government. Inter-clan fighting and the power vacuum resulting from Barre's departure caused over 300,000 Somali deaths from famine and disease, with thousands more perishing in battle.

Critical to this study is our understanding of the environment into which the UN would enter and why Somalia was wracked by anarchy and violence in the early 1990s.

The intent of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the history of the Somali people, and especially of the events which precipitated President Bush's decision to initiate "Operation Restore Hope". While not a comprehensive country study, it will highlight cultural attitudes, ethnic divisions, and critical environmental/operational problems in Somalia which the US commanders would soon face.

B. PRE-INDEPENDENCE

The Somali people are tied together by a common language, traditions, and by the Islamic religion[1]. Evidence indicates that the Somalis had occupied the Horn of Africa by 100 AD. They were known to the Arabs as the Berberi, but by the 18th century they were Somalis, a name derived from Samaal, their eponymous forebear [2]. Their first contact with Islam occurred in the 8th century, and today virtually all Somalis are Islamic. Central and northern Somalis are traditionally a nomadic, pastoral people, while most in the South are farmers. They are divided along clan lines and by borders created by the European colonialists at the end of the 19th century. Approximately 95 percent of Somali citizens are ethnic Somalis, divided into patrilineal descent groups (there are six major clan-families), each descended from a single male ancestor. Four of the clan-families are pastoral, and two are agricultural [3]. Somalis owe allegiance to the immediate family, the immediate lineage, the clan, the clan-family, and lastly the nation (in that order). This "segmentation" dictates a Somali's relationship with others, for the "segmentary law" would, for instance, pit two clans equidistant from a common ancestor against each other until such time that a common enemy might force them to ally [4]. Conflict within and

between clans is therefore recurrent until competition moves in, at which time these African "Hatfields and McCoys" cooperate long enough to turn on the intruder.

By 1885, the Somali people were divided and ruled by five different polities; the northwest (presently Djibouti) was French-controlled, the British had the north central, Ethiopia controlled the west (Ogaden), the south was under Italian rule, and the southwestern became part of Kenya. Each foreign power exploited Somalia for its own economic ends. Resistance to foreign rule and Somali nationalism surfaced briefly in the early 20th century with a Muslim resistance movement in the north fighting for Somali control of the Ogaden, and later during and after World War II; a true Somali nationalist movement grew out of Somali disaffection with colonial rule, and was encouraged by educated ethnic Somali colonial officials. In 1948, Britain gave the Ogaden to Ethiopia, a grievous blow to the pan-Somalis, since most of the Ogaden was ethnic Somali. [5]

For such a people bound by tradition and culture, this division has had a great impact on how Somalis view their nation; the greater Somali peoples are divided by artificially created borders. (This subjugation and division has contributed to Somali distrust of foreign interference, and probably contributed to the UN's problems in 1993.)

C. INDEPENDENCE AND BIRTH OF THE STATE

After ten years of UN-sponsored negotiations, British Somaliland became independent on 26 June 1960, and the Italian protectorate of Somalia on 1 July; both states immediately united to form the Somali Democratic Republic. The new democracy elected a president and a proportional number of seats in the new assembly were allocated for the northern and southern districts. While the UN "experiment" was a marginal success

in terms of unifying most ethnic Somalis and granting them sovereignty, the fledgling state faced numerous political and economic problems; Italy and Britain were to continue to provide economic aid for many years to maintain Somali solvency. [6]

Difficult problems confronted the new republic. Communications and travel were and remain today exceedingly difficult. Several months elapsed before a phone link connected the capital of Mogadishu and Hargeysa, the administrative center of the northern district; additionally, air flights were infrequent, and three days were needed to drive between the two cities when the roads were passable. Written Somali did not exist, requiring the use of both English and Italian in government documents. Great disparities existed between the North and South in the training and abilities of civil servants, the judiciary, the military, and the police. Similarly, the economies of the northern and southern districts were extremely disparate. Finally, shifts in political influence caused shifts in the power of certain clans. The northern clans now possessed less relative influence (the South carried about two thirds of the legislature seats), and the northern economy suffered more after the British exodus than did the southern. Discontent in the North peaked early, with an unsuccessful military coup attempt in Hargeysa in December of 1961. Divisions within Somalia were not clear-cut along North-South lines, but were more clan-family (tribal) in nature. In his 1963 book Somali Nationalism, Saadia Touval predicted that tribal divisions, North-South divisions, and especially the separation of the Somali peoples in Ethiopia, Kenya, and French Somaliland (Djibouti) from their Somali ethnic homeland would seriously affect Somalia's future [7]. How right he was!

In the 1960s, pan-Somalism became a major political issue, while internal corruption effectively paralyzed the government. A trend soon developed whereby numerous small political parties emerged before each national election (sixty-four by 1969)[8]. After the elections, however, opposition party members defected to the majority party in order to curry favor, receive appointments, and benefit financially. This virtual single-party rule made a mockery of the democratic process, and government degenerated into a veritable feeding frenzy [9]. These official abuses continued unabated until, following the president's assassination on 15 October 1969, the military seized power and established a Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) with the Army Commander, General Barre, as its president. Barre founded his new government based on younger, more idealistic (and malleable) police and military officers, and announced his intent to establish Scientific Socialism to combat poverty, disease, ignorance, and the tribal influences that impeded progress [10].

D. BARRE AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM

Barre attempted to solidify his rule and modernize Somalia, and initially met with some success. In order to accomplish his Marxist goals, he turned to the Soviet Union for help, drastically increased the size of his armed forces, and in July 1977 launched his war with Ethiopia in an unsuccessful bid to seize the Ogaden. The Soviets had threatened to support Ethiopia if war erupted, and were true to their word. While the Somalis initially fought well, a huge infusion of Soviet military aid (\$1.5 billion) to Ethiopia and an 11,000 man Cuban force with 1,500 Soviet advisors turned imminent victory into disastrous defeat for the Somalis. The war officially ended in 1978, but in its aftermath, about

650,000 refugees poured into Somalia, and Barre had lost three-fourths of his tank force, half his air force, and 8,000 troops KIA. [11] Barre now looked to the U.S. for assistance in rebuilding his armed forces. Even with the U.S. help, Barre's expenditures were enormous, and the national debt skyrocketed, resulting in a depressed economy coupled with spiraling inflation (500-800%). Perhaps as detrimental to Barre, however, was the delegitimization of the regime brought about by his inability to come through on his Somali unification promises [12].

In April of 1978, a failed coup by Mijerteen colonels led to severe reprisals against Mijerteens. Barre not only sent the army against the Mijerteens, but armed rival clans (such as the Darods) and encouraged them to occupy Mijerteen lands. Many surviving Mijerteens fled to Ethiopia, where they joined with other opposition groups to form a multi-clan anti-Barre insurgency, the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SSDF). Factional infighting soon reduced the SSDF to a Mijerteen insurgency, and reliance on Ethiopian bases and support caused the movement to lose popular Somali support. While unimportant militarily, the Mijerteen uprising is historically important, for it marks the beginning of a repetitive pattern that would ensue in Somalia throughout the 1980s. Northern opposition to Barre grew rapidly, with the Isaq clan-family upset over economic difficulties and the failed Ethiopian war. Barre encouraged Isaq competitors to occupy Isaq lands and resultant fighting served to temporarily repress Isaq dissent. The fighting continued unabated, and eventually resulted in the government's virtual destruction of Hargeysa, the second largest city in Somalia. (This was not simply a state maintaining control through the energetic use of its military, it was genocidal warfare aimed at the

total destruction of a rival tribe through the use of the military and other tribes.) Barre was losing his ability to maintain control through peaceful government as dissension and insurgencies gradually spread throughout Somalia. Increasingly, his clan-dominated national army became the praetorian guard and former political supporters were forced to choose between political/state and tribal loyalty, further polarizing the Somali political landscape.

In 1990, 144 well-known moderate Somali leaders attempting to stave off anarchy signed a manifesto calling for reconciliation and regime reforms in a futile attempt to stem the rising violence [13]. Barre arrested many of the signatories, condemning his own regime in the process. He became increasingly isolated, eventually controlling only a small enclave in Mogadishu. A dizzying number of armed opposition movements, some allied and others fighting with each other, strove to oust Barre and establish themselves, using Soviet, Ethiopian, and American arms and, most significantly, food, as a weapon. A common tactic throughout the conflict involved scorched-earth operations. After repeated offensives and counter-offensives, most agriculture and livestock had been destroyed throughout the country, and refugees in the hundreds of thousands fled to the cities and neighboring countries to escape the devastation. On 27 January 1991, Barre departed Mogadishu for his tribal lands in the south, removing the last vestiges of central government in Somalia. His exit created a power vacuum, with more war in store as each clan leader vied for control of territory and increasingly scarce resources.

E. DEATH OF THE STATE AND ITS PEOPLE

While the U.S. Congress suspended military support in 1988, little international effort was devoted to altering the flow of events in Somalia. With Barre's departure, however, a window of opportunity was presented to the international community when the clan leaders agreed to a general cease-fire. While this may have been an honest attempt at reconciliation, it may also have been just a breather in order to prepare for the next conflict, which began in November of 1991 when heavy fighting broke out between the self-declared interim Somali president, Ali Mahdi, and his principle rival, Muhammad Farah Aidid. Various Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs) were at this time active in Somalia, attempting to halt the spreading famine created by the war with Barre, and this renewed fighting caused most of them to withdraw. The spreading disaster came to the world's attention, and on January 23, 1992, UN Security Council Resolution 733 was approved, calling for a general arms embargo and a cessation of internal hostilities. Attention focused on Ali Mahdi and Aidid, and a UN brokered agreement resulted in a cease-fire in Mogadishu and the establishment in April of UNOSOM, a very modest UN humanitarian mission under the UN secretary-general's special representative, Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria. While Sahnoun was focused on saving lives (by March, an estimated 300,000 Somalis had perished of hunger and disease, with over 1.5 million more at immediate risk [14]), his strategy was to use the clans to assist in aid deliveries. Boutros Boutros-Ghali states, however, that, "National reconciliation was therefore, from the beginning, an integral part of UNOSOM's mandate" [15]. While both approaches would not necessarily conflict, the reconciliation soon became an effort to marginalize the clan

leaders by promoting moderate community elders and leaders as the future government. The UN leadership became disaffected with clan leaders, yet still strove to use them to help protect food deliveries and foreign volunteers. By Sahnoun's admission, UNOSOM's reliance on the HROs and 50 unarmed UN observers was impotent and unable to reach into the rural areas where the most Somalis were at risk. Some worthwhile proposals (such as establishment of a national police force) surfaced, and several rounds of reconciliation peace talks occurred, all to no avail. Interestingly, the UN lost credibility with Aidid*, resulting in increased tensions in Mogadishu and the paralytic situation of the Pakistani battalion sent to Somalia to provide security. Aidid threatened the Pakistanis, forcing them to pay "protection", and would not allow them to leave their barracks.

In August, Boutros-Ghali presented a 100-day plan whereby the UN would massively increase its efforts in Somalia. This would be a nation-wide push, with 3,500 troops distributed in four operational zones. The military would provide security and assistance to the HROs for the effort involving emergency relief, institution-building, infrastructure reconstruction, cease-fire monitoring, containment of hostilities, demobilization, disarmament, and national reconciliation [16]. News of the plan reached Somalia as something of a surprise. At this point, the Pakistani battalion had not even arrived yet, and already the UN was planning to drastically increase its military presence.

* The UN's problems with Aidid may originate from his perception that the UN supported his rival, Ali Mahdi. Rumors to this end persisted, reinforced by reports of Russian UN-marked aircraft flying arms and currency to Ali Mahdi in the North. Apparently, these same aircraft then ferried UN officials about Somalia, possibly including Mr. David Bassioun, who was suddenly expelled on 28 Oct 92 by Aidid, the same day Aidid threatened the UN with violence if it attempted to expand the UNOSOM force. Rumors in Somalia during the fall of 1992 persisted that Boutros Boutros-Ghali wished to establish a UN protectorate in Somalia, again presenting the UN as a threat to Aidid. [17]

Even worse, the neighboring countries and Sahnoun had not been consulted before the announcement, and therefore had been unable to negotiate with the clan leaders [18]. This was a major loss of face, and eventually contributed to Sahnoun's resignation in late October. Ultimately, only the Pakistani battalion deployed to Somalia.

As the looting and banditry increased in the fall of 1992, so did the death toll. The UN was unable to deal with Aidid's intransigence in Mogadishu, and this seemed to paralyze the whole process. Efforts were ongoing elsewhere in Somalia, including Operation Provide Relief airlifts into Southern Somalia and Northern Kenya, but conditions called for a drastic approach. On November 12, Aidid demanded that UNOSOM troops leave the Mogadishu airport, and Ali Mahdi claimed that food was being diverted to aid Aidid. He was more likely taking it, as the relief had slowed to a trickle and warehouses were regularly sacked [19]. On November 25, the Security Council agreed with Boutros-Ghali that a different approach was needed. The Security Council adopted resolution 794 on 3 December declaring the Somali situation a "threat to international peace and security" and authorizing "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" under Chapter VII provisions [20]. President Bush offered to spearhead the effort, and Operation Restore Hope was born.

F. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

In analyzing lessons learned from UNOSOM I, LTG Barry McCaffrey wrote while serving as the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff:

It became clear that Somalia required a three-track approach:

1) Establish security

- 2) Assist the NGOs/PVOs in the delivery of humanitarian relief
- 3) Conduct initial actions to restore some semblance of law and order through creation of an indigenous police force and local political authority.

If any one leg lagged the others or failed, the situation would only crumble, as we were seeing in November 1992. [21]

UNOSOM I was overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of the crisis in Somalia.

Clan leaders such as Aidid publicly espoused support for the humanitarian effort, yet privately worked to subvert it*. The UN strategy in Somalia was to employ diplomatic efforts to encourage national reconciliation as a long-term fix, while garnering clan support for aid efforts as the short-term famine solution. The US would certainly face the same environmental challenges as its UN predecessor, and its solution was to impose control over Somalia with a large military force as the short-term solution, leaving the long-term "political" fix to the UN. With such a robust force as compared to the meager UNOSOM I military effort, the US could be counted on to make short-term progress. However, drawing a distinct line between the short and long term is exceedingly difficult. At what point can a poorly integrated short-term success interfere with the long-term goal, perhaps even inducing its ultimate failure? Given that famine was used by the clans as a weapon, would the US force be grappling with the root issues of the conflict, or the symptoms? As we will see in the following chapter, the US was reluctant to involve itself "politically" (long-term) in the Somali affair. Therefore, a somewhat conventional military solution was sought out. While the solution to the clan conflict apparently required a

* In Dec of 91, US SEALs discovered "thousands of 300-lb bags of rice" on the Mogadishu harbor bottom. Someone in Mogadishu was intentionally inducing famine by depriving the Somalis of a great deal of the aid [22]. The Somali crisis was indeed an extremely unconventional conflict by Western standards.

military solution, perhaps the response to such an “unconventional” conflict should have engendered an “unconventional” military response. The US military must be flexibly responsive to the requirements of our civilian leadership, and President Bush’s decision to send forces to Africa demonstrates that the military will not choose which conflicts we feel are best suited to our organizational makeup. Limiting our response capabilities by our institutional biases (what we are “comfortable” with) may very well limit our organizational efficiency and effectiveness, especially in situations calling for creative solutions. The crisis in Somalia certainly demanded a creative solution. Would the US military respond creatively to the challenge?

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IV. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

A. INTRODUCTION

When one mentions the US participation in Humanitarian Assistance operations in Somalia, most Americans think of the battles of 3-4 October 1993, in which 18 US service members were killed, over 70 were wounded, and hundreds of Somalis perished in the most intense small unit conflict we have experienced since Vietnam. Few, however, recall more successful operations just a few months earlier, when US and coalition service members and volunteers saved hundreds of thousands of Somalis. In fact, Operation Restore Hope was relatively successful in the Winter and Spring of 1993.

The UNOSOM mission to Somalia was paralyzed and incapable of stemming the rampant fighting, starvation, and disease. A handful of diplomats and lightly armed second-rate peacekeeping troops had little hope of stemming the violence. The UN troops could barely secure themselves, not to mention establish long-term security for relief efforts and foster an environment conducive to national reconciliation. The UN called "911", and the US military answered. No other institution could have so quickly and effectively entered the scene, subdued the clans, and returned the Humanitarian Relief Organizations to the business of saving lives. Why, then, would I choose to examine such an apparently successful operation? Why not go after UNOSOM II, quite an easier target? The answer is simple: This thesis will not attempt to prove that a SOF- led organization can succeed where others have failed; in most (but not all) situations such as Somalia, the US military will enjoy some level of success given a sufficiently robust capability. Success on the ground, however, must be weighed against the costs involved and the political and

strategic objectives. This study will demonstrate that UNITAF could have been more efficient, smaller, more flexible, and more effective. UNITAF suboptimized because its organizational structure was not appropriate for the mission.

This study of operations in Somalia will examine how the composition of the JTF limited its strategy development and subsequent execution at the small-unit tactical level. I will not analyze UNOSOM II, except in regard to operational handoff from the US to the UN and eventual results at the “macro” level. The first portion of the study will present a brief overview of the UN mandate, the Restore Hope (RH) organization and chronology of events, the JTF execution strategy, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), and the US exit strategy. The second portion will analyze the JTF’s strategy and execution in regard to stated objectives to determine if the JTF optimized in pursuit of each objective, and what variables contributed to or detracted from optimization. In order to keep the study length and structure focused, I will restrict the study to C4I areas, intentionally omitting most logistical issues. Admittedly, logistics are an integral part of an operation such as this, yet the topic is better saved for later discussion as I apply the Joint Task Force XXI model to Operation Restore Hope.

B. OVERVIEW OF OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

1. UN Mandate

The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) was established under UN mandate and was “authorized to use force to establish secure conditions for humanitarian relief, although the resolution made no specific reference to disarmament or demobilization”[1]. Restore Hope set a new precedent in UN operations in that it was the first time member states were

authorized to use military force for humanitarian ends in an internal conflict while not under UN command. (Military action under Chapter VII had been invoked in the 1950 Korean conflict, in an oil embargo of Southern Rhodesia in 1966, and twice during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf conflict)[2]. The United States spearheaded the Combined Joint Task Force, Somalia (later redesignated UNITAF), and christened the operation "Restore Hope".

UNITAF was sent to Somalia to address the immediate humanitarian crisis which UNOSOM I was unable to manage; in Boutros Boutros-Ghali's words to the Somalis, "to feed the starving, protect the defenceless and prepare the way for political, economic, and social reconstruction"[3]. In applying the Mission Analysis process to the UN mandates, boiled down to their essence in Boutros-Ghali's words, several specified tasks surface for the US-led forces. First and foremost was the requirement to "feed the starving". The second specified task was to "protect the defenceless", taken to mean primarily the Somali innocents and the Humanitarian Relief Organization (HRO) employees and volunteers. The third specified task was that of "preparing the way" for what essentially amounted to nation-building on an nearly unprecedented scale (post-World War II efforts in Germany and Japan aside). One specified task mentioned in Res 733 (23 Jan 92) and reiterated in Res 794 called for a complete embargo on deliveries of all military equipment and weapons to Somalia. Nowhere, however, was mention made of the huge arms stockpiles already in Somali hands. This issue was left to the discretion of the Commander, Joint Task Force (COMJTF). Implicitly, he could collect them if he felt it necessary, but was

not compelled to. In this area, as in many others, he would rely on personal experience, the advice he was to receive from his subordinates, and intelligence reports.

2. UNITAF Mission, Strategy, and Organization

The CENTCOM mission statement to the JTF read:

When directed by the NCA, USCINCCENT will conduct joint/combined military operations in Somalia to secure the major air and sea ports, key installations and food distribution points, to provide open and free passage of relief supplies, provide security for convoys and relief organization operations, and assist UN/NGO's in providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices. Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces.[4]

The I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF) HQs, Camp Pendleton, CA, was designated the JTF, with its Commanding General, LtGen Robert B. Johnston, designated COMJTF. The JTF received OPCON of the I MEF, the 10th Mountain Division (Light)(-) commanded by MG Arnold, 3 amphibious ships, 1 carrier battle group, airlift support from a C-130 squadron, strategic sealift and MPS ships, SOF elements (SF, CA, PSYOP, & SEALs), a JTF Support Command (JTFSC) from 13th COSCOM, and eventual support from twenty other nation's militaries[5]. (For UNITAF organization, see Figure 4.1.) The COMJTF organized the UNITAF operation into four phases. Initial planning was for unilateral US operations; inclusion of other forces early-on expanded UNITAF's capabilities [6].

- Phase I, D - D+24 - Secure Mogadishu airfield and seaport with afloat marine forces, and secure Baidoa.
- Phase II, - D+90 - Deploy UNITAF forces into Baidoa and expand security operations into Central Somalia.

- Phase III, - D+180 - Expand security operations to the south to include Kismayo and Bardera.
- Phase IV, - D+240 - Transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. [7]

RH was a Peace Enforcement operation, with a planned transition to UN Peacekeeping forces under UN command (UNOSOM II) [8]. LtGen Johnston's concept involved a typical "expanding bubble" amphibious-type operation in which landings were




Figure 4.1- UNITAF Organization [50]

to be made, lodgments secured, and forces gradually expanded. The pace of operations was to increase as forces, equipment, and supplies arrived in-theater, with force protection always paramount; all elements were to be kept under tight control and each step was planned in great detail to minimize risk to the force and enhance mission success probabilities. UNITAF's goal was to rapidly stabilize the Somali situation by displacing

the gangs and clan factions with UNITAF combat forces, allowing the HROs to reenter the Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRSs). The US Department of State established the United States Liaison Office (USLO) under Ambassador Robert Oakley in Mogadishu to provide a diplomatic link between UNITAF, the UN agencies, and the Somali factions. Ambassador Oakley worked concurrently with coalition forces to ensure that the factions would not interfere with UNITAF operations. This was the carrot and the stick approach, with Oakley initiating diplomatic negotiations with the factions under the overarching presence of the US "big stick". Once the HROs had returned and the factions were subdued, UNITAF was to hand off responsibility to the UN, with US presence remaining only in the form of a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) brigade from the 10th MTN DIV (L) and about 3,000 logistics personnel left in-country (for a total US cap of 4,500) [9].

The UNITAF tactics were simple. Each HRS was assigned to a different designated Task Force for initial securing. Initial securing was conducted by the more capable, "elite" units (i.e., the US Marines, 10th MTN, Belgian Commandos, or the French), normally at battalion size or larger, depending on the size of the sector. The aid distribution centers, normally in the major population center(s), were usually secured first, either by air assault or ground convoy. Then operations gradually fanned out to smaller towns and villages, with convoys and relief workers protected by UNITAF forces. Task Force commanders normally tried to set up a dialogue with local clan leaders and elders in an attempt to prevent misunderstandings and outbreaks of violence. Often, HRSs were handed off to other coalition partners to allow the more combat-capable units to secure new sectors. Ultimately, UNITAF actually occupied only the southern portion of Somalia

(about 40%; Somaliland did not want a UNITAF presence and central Somalia was left for the UNSOM II effort). The UNITAF operations, especially in regard to disarmament, were relatively gradual and benign, although with the ever-present threat of overwhelming armed force. Clans were provided ample opportunity to adjust to UNITAF operations by moving heavy weapons out of the cities, where they were essentially out of UNITAF's reach. This gradual expansion also reduced surprise and the inadvertent chance contact or mistake that could have resulted in conflict. For the relatively robust US-led force and the short-term nature of the mission, this strategy seemed effective.

When repeatedly questioned by the US Senate Armed Services Committee in December 1992 about defining mission success, LtGen Martin L. Brandtner, USMC (JCS J-3), responded:

That definition is going to be when the Joint Task Force Commander is convinced that the security situation on the ground is stabilized to the point where United Nations security forces can come in and relieve the United States combat forces, who would then withdraw and turn over those security areas to the United Nations forces. That is a judgment call on his part, and when he is satisfied, that's when that flow will commence. [10]

Restore Hope, at least from a US perspective, was not designed to rebuild the Somali infrastructure, nor to directly result in long term national reconciliation, nor to disarm and demobilize the clans. It was designed to rapidly subdue most of the conflict, allow the HROs to reenter the scene, and give the UN an opportunity to establish a structure capable of pursuing the goals the US would not pursue. The stated MOE was not highly quantifiable; rather, it was a judgment call on the part of the COMJTF. This left him with a great deal of operational flexibility. He was provided guidance, however, from

CINCCENT in the latter part of the mission statement: "Upon establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations, USCINCCENT terminates and transfers relief operations to U.N. peacekeeping forces"[11]. LtGen Johnston's tactical commanders would soon be asked to evaluate not only the current state of affairs within their sectors, but also Somali clan capabilities and intentions toward continued relief operations under UN auspices. This is a point that will be addressed further in the next chapter.

The exit strategy for UNITAF was meant to be a gradual, event-driven, "seamless" process. Basic principles emerged, specifically:

- 1) Transition by function
- 2) Set not later than time-lines for completing transitions (keyed to major events)
- 3) Transition earlier than scheduled, if possible (be flexible) and
- 4) Don't allow a capability to be removed until the replacement is operating. [12]

Major functional areas requiring transition included command and control, logistics, local police security (including supervision of the fledgling police forces), communications, medical services, and engineer services. UNOSOM II forces were to be identified, deployed to Somalia, and would gradually transition and assume HRS responsibilities from UNITAF, then expand into the rest of Somalia. Some UNITAF forces were to remain in-country to support UNOSOM II, to include the QRF and CSS units.

3. Restore Hope Execution

Operations in Somalia progressed at a faster pace than originally envisaged by planners. In Congressional testimony, the JCS J-3 attributed the significantly faster pace of

operations to a lack of significant Somali armed resistance as originally expected and an unexpectedly rapid recruitment and deployment of coalition forces. I will briefly review major events in each phase; a detailed chronology appears at Figure 4.2 (page 85).

a. Phase I (9-16 Dec)

Operation Restore Hope officially commenced under the glare of television camera lights on a beach near Mogadishu at 0230 hours, 9 December 1992, as Marine reconnaissance teams moved ashore, to be followed in force later that morning as the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) secured the port and international airport[14]. Advance elements of the 13th Demibrigade of the French Foreign Legion from Djibouti joined the Marines in Mogadishu [15]. Neither element encountered resistance.

Marines were not the first US forces to enter Somalia. Army Special Forces soldiers from 2d Bn, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) operated in Somalia as early as August in support of Operation Provide Relief, and Navy SEALs reconnoitered undetected in the Mogadishu area since the night of 6 December in preparation for the Marine landings [16]. LtGen Johnston arrived in Mogadishu on 10 December, and JTF Somalia was redesignated UNITAF [17]. Marines secured the airfield at Baledoogle, and a Marine/French Foreign Legion contingent then secured another airfield in Baidoa. UNITAF now controlled three major airfields capable of receiving follow-on forces, and Phase I was complete.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Oakley successfully negotiated a truce between Aidid and Ali Mahdi calling for a cease-fire, reconstitution of the United Somali Congress

(USC), disarmament (including “technicals”), and removal of the “green line” barriers in Mogadishu [18].

b. Phase II (17-28 Dec)

Phases I and II overlapped, as Phase II began with UNITAF's arrival at Baledoogle [19]. Under media and Red Cross pressure, UNITAF forces conducted amphibious landings at Kismayo ahead of schedule, securing the port and airfield with no resistance from the local clan-leader and Aidid ally, Colonel Omar Jess. (Jess readily agreed to keep his men out of UNITAF's way.) Subsequent airfields secured included Bardera, Oddur (USMC/Legion under French command), and Gialalassi (Italians & US Army). On 19 December, Boutros Boutros-Ghali publicly reiterated his view that UNITAF should disarm the factions and gangs and pacify all of Somalia before handoff to UNOSOM II [20]. Finally, a combined Belgian/Canadian air assault secured Belet Uen[21] and Phase II drew to a close.

c. Phase III (29 Dec-26 Mar)

Phase III was planned as an extension of Phase II, in which UNITAF further expanded operations, securing ports, airfields, major road junctions, and cities for use as food distribution sites. These distribution sites were to form the nucleus of the HRSs. The HRSs were initially designated based on distribution sites and the road network; boundaries were only later adjusted to account for Somali clan influence. Eight of the nine distribution sites were secured during Phase II, and the ninth (Merka) was secured on 31 December. Each formed the core of an HRS. [22] HROs were able to increase food delivery under UNITAF protection, and engineers constructed or repaired

1,200 miles of roads and erected two Bailey bridges; operations soon expanded to include 35 new distribution sites [23].

The first major example of clan resistance to the UNITAF presence occurred on 6 January when UNITAF convoys received small-arms fire from an Aidid cantonment area near the US embassy in Mogadishu. The following day, two USMC rifle companies, M1 tanks, and AH-1 helicopters surrounded the two compounds; the occupants of one surrendered, while those of the second fired on the Marines. The US forces returned fire and secured the compound and its occupants in 20 minutes. While inter and intra-clan fighting still occasionally occurred throughout Somalia, this action and arms seizures are credited with deterring major attacks on UNITAF forces for some time to come. [24]

UNITAF attempted to enhance security through development of the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF). Former Somali police officers were hired and assisted the UNITAF Provost Marshall and MPs in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, Belet Uen, Oddur, Bardera, and 10 other locations by 15 February. [25] While these were local, not regional forces, they were credited with aiding in the reduction of violent crime in the areas they were active. Also on the brighter side, the 15 Jan Addis Ababa agreement signed by 15 factions agreed to a cease-fire, disarmament of heavy weapons, general demobilization, and preparations for a national reconciliation conference.

The Phase III goals were met on 29 January with the establishment of the 9 HRSs throughout Southern Somalia, and Phases III and IV now overlapped.

d. Phase IV (29 Jan-4 May)

Phase IV was planned to transition responsibility from the US to the UN. Because most Phase III goals were met in January, the COMJTF turned off the flow of deploying personnel, and even initiated redeployment before Phase III officially ended. Troop strength peaked on 19 January, with 25,074 US personnel assigned to UNITAF [26]. Provide Relief air operations ceased in late February after having delivered an average of 2,700 metric tons of aid a week (770,000 meals per day) to the Somalis. By 26 March, all HRSs had been turned over to coalition partners except Mogadishu and Merka, which were subsequently accepted by Pakistan in late April. [27]

Transition to UNOSOM II was slowed by diplomatic negotiations in the UN Security Council over the wording (and thus authority) of the UNOSOM II mandate. UNSCR 814 was finally passed on 26 March, providing authorization for UNOSOM II to officially assume control when ready. LTG Cevik Bir of Turkey arrived in Somalia 8 March and began the unofficial transition process. The core of the UNOSOM II staff began arriving in April, and SecState Warren Christopher notified the UN on 23 April that the UNITAF mission was completed and US forces were prepared to return home [28]. MG Thomas Montgomery was dual-hatted as the Deputy Commander UNOSOM II Forces Command and as the Commander, US Forces Somalia (USFORSOM). Admiral (Ret) Jonathan Howe, Special Representative to the UN secretary-general, replaced his predecessor Ismat Kittani. Special Envoy Gosende replaced Ambassador Oakley as the chief US diplomat in Somalia.

Johnston and Montgomery convinced Bir that UNOSOM II, enhanced by US logistic, intelligence, and QRF support, was ready to assume the mission. On 4 May, Operation Restore Hope drew to a close, and Operation Continue Hope commenced under the blue flag of the UN.

4. Operational Results

If evaluated only against the most obvious stated objectives and without regard to later UNOSOM II failures, Operation Restore Hope appeared successful. A JTF was assembled over a period of a few short weeks encompassing large forces from all four US services and 20 foreign countries. UNITAF was primarily composed of conventional, General Purpose infantry and support units designed for combat, not Humanitarian Assistance or Nation-Building. Commanders, staffs, and service members at all levels were thrown into a drastically new mission and environment with little or no opportunity for preparation and training. Many organizations assumed missions for which they had never trained. For instance, the 10th Mountain Division (Light) was designated the ARFOR, expanding the organization's responsibilities and requirements greatly. In a typical combat environment, a Division Commander would not be tasked with such a responsibility. Even Corps Commanders in Desert Storm were not tasked with ARFOR Command and Control. Another example can be seen in the MARFOR's OPCON of 9 coalition elements in the Mogadishu area (see Figure 4.1). Certainly, the Marines did not have the opportunity to train extensively for this Humanitarian Assistance mission, not to mention the awesome responsibility of coordinating and controlling such disparate coalition organizations. The most demanding task faced by UNITAF was that of constantly juggling

the requirements of force protection in an austere, hostile environment with the demands placed by the various governmental agencies, our coalition partners, the HROs, the ever-present media, the competing clans, and finally, the Somali “man on the street” UNITAF was there to save. Through it all, US troops performed admirably.

However, saying that “we did the best we could with what we had” does not bring back dead soldiers, any more than it turns subsequent failure into success. Nor does it help us to prepare for future such crises (as we will inevitably face) in any substantially meaningful manner. In order to improve our performance in the future, the US military must critically examine why we approached the challenges in Somalia the way we did, and determine if we could have done better and how.

25 Nov - U.S. offers to lead UN security effort
 27 Nov - CINCCENT designates I MEF JTF (VOCO)
 1 Dec - 10th Mtn Div (LT) alerted as ARFOR
 3 Dec - Sec Council adopts Res 794 and accepts U.S. leadership
 9 Dec - D-Day, 15th MEU secures Mogadishu air and sea ports.
 13 Dec - Coalition secures Baledoogle, **Phase II begins**
 15 Dec - 10th Mtn initiates deployment
 16 Dec - MARFOR Main arrives Mogadishu; 15th MEU secures Baidoa = **Ph I complete**
 20 Dec - USMC and Belgians secure Kismayo
 23 Dec - Landmine kills 1 U.S. civilian, injures 3 nearby; USMC secures Bardera
 24 Dec - USMC secures Bardera
 25 Dec - French/USMC secure Oddur
 28 Dec - USA/Italians secure Gialalassi, Belgians/Canadians Belet Uen, = **Ph II ends**
 28 Dec - Aidid-Ali Mahdi Green-Line peace march, Mogadishu
 31 Dec - ARFOR & Belgians secure Merka, all HRSs declared "secure"
 1 Jan - President Bush visits Somalia
 6 Jan - Convoys take fire near US embassy
 7 Jan - MARFOR assaults Aideed compounds
 9 Jan - Kismayo placed under gun control policy
 10 Jan - 10th MTN (MAIN) closes into Somalia (129 air sorties)
 13 Jan - First U.S. service member (Marine) KIA vic. Mogadishu Airfield
 15 Jan - Addis Ababa agreement signed
 24 Jan - COL Morgan's forces rout COL Jess from Kismayo = Ceasefire broken
 25 Jan - BG Magruder warns COL Morgan to remove technicals from Kismayo
 26 Jan - AH1s destroy technicals convoy vic. Kismayo
 29 Jan - **Phase III goals attained; overlap with Phase IV.**
 10 Feb - UN forces assume Mogadishu responsibility
 11 Feb - India agrees to assume Bardera HRS
 18 Feb - ARFOR Main begins redeployment
 21 Feb - Morgan attacks Kismayo
 22 Feb - MG Arnold instructs Morgan to withdraw from Kismayo
 24 Feb - Aideed-organized large anti-U.S. protest in Mogadishu
 25 Feb - 4 Marines WIA in 24 hour period
 26 Feb - Morgan withdraws from Kismayo
 28 Feb - **Op Provide Relief Flight Ops Terminated**
 1 Mar - Moroccans secure HRS Baledogle
 9 Mar - ADM (Ret) Howe succeeds Kittani as Spec Rep to UN SecGen for Somalia
 26 Mar - Sec Council adopts Res 814 (establishes UNOSOM II)
 26 Mar - **Phase III officially ends.**
 27 Mar - 15 factions sign reconciliation agreement in Addis Ababa
 4 May - Handoff to UNOSOM II = **Phase IV complete**, reduction to 4 UN HRSs
 5 Jun - 24 Pakistanis KIA in south Mogadishu after USC/SNA weapons site searches
 17 Jun - Adm Howe issues warrant for arrest of Aidid
 3 Oct - TF Ranger raid, 18 US KIA, 77 US WIA, 1 Malaysian KIA
 7 Oct - Pres Clinton announces complete US withdrawal by end of Mar 94.

FIGURE 4.2 - Chronology, Operation Restore Hope & Aftermath [51]

C. RESTORE HOPE ANALYSIS

1. Method of Analysis

In analyzing Operation RH, I will examine mission-essential specified and implied tasks. These critical tasks are derived from the CENTCOM mission statement, as NCA, UN, and CINC expectations are coalesced into the mission statement for the JTF. I will examine each task, looking for suboptimization. I will then identify reasons for UNITAF's performance on each identified task. If the reason directly involves one of the "Critical Independent Variables (CIVs)" as described in Chapter II, I will address it further in the following chapter. If it involves one of the other variables, it may or may not involve the "CIVs". We may find at times that one or more of the "CIVs" actually becomes an intervening variable between the other independent variables and the dependent variables.

2. Task Analysis

a. U.S. National Command Authority Expectations

The President's expectations of the military in any regional operation are translated to the COMJTF through the Regional CINC's mission statement. Prior to terminating relief operations, LtGen Johnston was to accomplish four specified and one implied critical tasks from the CENTCOM mission statement:

- 1) Secure air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points.
- 2) Provide security and assistance to the HROs to allow them to save the Somalis.
- 3) "Establish a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations"[29].
- 4) Terminate and transfer operations to the UN peacekeeping elements.

4 ½) The critical implied task was the facilitation of the UN's assumption of control from UNITAF and accomplishment of its stated objectives.

UNITAF's purpose was to establish conditions enabling the UN to assume control of the humanitarian operation. Thus, as an enabler, UNITAF needed to maintain awareness of the situation UNOSOM II would inherit, its abilities to continue and expand upon UNITAF's work, and potential shortfalls which might jeopardize the overall mission.

b. Task One

UNITAF apparently succeeded in the first specified task: ports, airfields, distribution centers, and key installations (such as the US embassy, major road networks, bridges, and aid warehouses) were secured so quickly that Restore Hope's operational tempo outpaced the projected timeline by 13 weeks upon handoff. As already mentioned, the lack of Somali resistance and increased coalition participation sped the operation. One must consider, however, three potential factors in this lack of resistance. One, obviously, was the robust force structure's intimidating effects on the Somali clans. Second, Ambassador Oakley's negotiations with the clans prior to UNITAF's arrival certainly produced some level of cooperation sufficient at least for forces to establish a presence. Third, the clan leaders were savvy enough not to confront US forces when they were "locked and cocked", looking for resistance. Instead, the clans simply moved heavy weapons into the countryside out of UNITAF's reach [30] or into authorized cantonment areas, waiting for the need or opportunity to strike at each other or at UNITAF. This is precisely how an insurgent-like organization would operate, never hitting its enemy where the enemy is strong, instead biding its time, gathering intelligence, strengthening its base of

support among the populace and waiting for an opportunity to strike. The lack of Somali resistance should have produced some concern for UNITAF, for while the lack of resistance looked good for Phases I and II, it certainly spelled trouble for Phases III and IV and for UNOSOM II forces. The clans were allowed to retain a substantial military capability by the force designed to eradicate that capability so long as the clans did not directly threaten UNITAF with that capability.

There existed suboptimization on two levels in this first task. First, while UNITAF heeded the predictions about the likely strong resistance to be encountered from the Somalis, it misestimated the time, location, and nature of the resistance, expecting to see it en masse upon entry or soon thereafter, thus employing a far larger and more expensive force than was appropriate. Planners and commanders apparently either did not appreciate the nature of an insurgent-like movement*, or perhaps did not view the clans as insurgent-like organizations with leaders just as cunning as those we faced thirty years ago in South Vietnam. The second failure is related to the first, and involves a distinct lack of HUMINT collection, especially prior to D-Day [31]. A concerted HUMINT effort conducted by low-key elements with a moderate level of cultural awareness might well have indicated the benign nature of the immediate tactical threat before the initial 9 December landings as well as subsequent HRS securing operations. While a SEAL platoon from ST-1 attached to the Tripoli ATU conducted hydrographic, beach landing,

* While one may argue as to whether or not the clans were in fact insurgencies, history demonstrates their use of insurgency tactics (e.g., the war against Barre). The Somalis were adept and successful at insurgency-style warfare, and were thus likely to quickly resume such a campaign if the need arose (such as perceived foreign subjugation).

and limited port reconnaissance as early as 6 December [32], SOF assets were not utilized in other Special Reconnaissance and collection capacities. The intelligence the MEU received prior to 9 December was redundant and dated, with sparse information about the opposition [33]. A better informed commander might have then modified the plan, approaching the situation in a more creative or efficient manner, possibly enhancing the JTF's performance in pursuit of the second and third tasks, or at least eliminating the deployment of unnecessary equipment and forces. By the Army's estimate:

Unnecessary equipment was deployed, wasting valuable lift capabilities... In this deployment, 1000 plus pieces of equipment (including 900 vehicles and 16 helicopters) were deployed and reloaded without being used because they were unnecessary. This represented approximately 18% of the total equipment deployed by sealift. The reason for deploying equipment not needed was primarily METT-T, inability of the IPB process to determine clan intent and difficulty in defining end state. Commanders must have the right information, and a good understanding of the context to which it is to be applied, in order to make correct deployment decisions if we are to project the right force at the right time. [34]

Suboptimization in the first task resulted from aspects of all the "CIVs".

The JTF was not organized or trained to conduct an "unconventional" securing of key installations. Conventional war-fighting doctrine calls for overwhelming force and either lightning-quick strikes with maximum use of firepower given a high quality intelligence picture, or an overwhelming force moving cautiously (developing the situation). Given the dearth of intelligence, the force chose caution, allowing the clans to react (choose between resistance and withdrawal) and retain military capabilities. Throughout, Somali factions retained the operational and strategic initiative. UNITAF operations were rarely proactive in an obvious attempt to avoid confrontation, and probably missed numerous subtle

opportunities to reduce the clans' capabilities to jeopardize the long-term mission. Staff and subordinate commanders could not (or would not) suggest a radically different approach, and LtGen Johnston's own highly conventional experience certainly caused him to reduce risk by moving cautiously. At this point, one may ask: "Why did the operation proceed so much faster than scheduled if UNITAF moved cautiously?" The answer is that cautious UNITAF elements simply exceeded even more cautious plans. Imagine what might have occurred given an accurate assessment of the situation and the "CIV" capability to capitalize. This option will be discussed in the next chapter.

In addition to the "CIVs", variables affecting the first task included increased participation from coalition partners and the actions of the substate actors (clan leaders and Somali populace). The Somalis apparently decided not to resist; this decision may have been a result of the UNITAF Show of Force, a non-confrontational tactic intended to lull UNITAF, or most likely a combination of the two. Since force can be demonstrated in more than one way, we can never be sure if the size of a force equates to its deterrent effectiveness. The deterrent value of a force is an important factor which will also be discussed in the next chapter.

c. Task Three

At this point, we can skip to the third task, that of "establishing a secure environment for uninterrupted relief operations", as it is related to the first task. (These two tasks most closely resembled "war fighting" in some respects, especially in regards to force sizing.) The third task is also the most important, for UNITAF was not meant to solve all of Somalia's ills, but to reestablish the UN's ability to deal with the problem. This

is as close as the NCA (through the CINC) came to instructing the JTF to disarm and demobilize the Somali clans, or at least neutralize their effectiveness. In an 8 December 1992 letter to President Bush in reference to Operation Restore Hope, Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserts that:

Any forceful action by the international community in Somalia must have the objective of ensuring that at least the heavy weapons of the organized factions are neutralized and brought under international control and that the irregular forces and gangs are disarmed. [35]

While not strictly delineated as a task in the mission statement, disarmament was pitched as the main method of ensuring the continued security of relief operations. When questioned by Senator Warner on 9 December about disarmament goals, LtGen Brandtner responded:

Senator, if there is a cache of weapons that we know exists that would pose a threat or if we find it, I am going to tell you that we'll take it... What I'm saying is we are not going to go out into the hinterlands and try to search out every square mile of the territory to disarm. But I guarantee you that the commander on the scene is going to take care of things like that. [36]

Although this statement may be interpreted a number of ways, it would appear that both the UN and the US Congress expected the robust UNITAF force to neutralize the clan militias' offensive capabilities before insertion of less combat capable UNOSOM II troops. Earlier in his testimony, however, LtGen Brandtner did emphasize that follow-on forces would need the capability to deal with security threats as they arose [37], a statement that is par for the course for any peacekeeping force. While never disavowing the disarmament role, the US initially shied away from it, viewing it as too

politically intrusive. In a 4 December Oval Office speech, President Bush stated, "We do not plan to dictate political outcomes" [38]. UNITAF early-on avoided any disarmament role, at one point withdrawing from an arms dump rather than confiscating them from an Aidid ally, Osman Atto [39]. Here we see the first examples of mission-creep, where UNITAF forces began confiscating weapons in order to create security zones, without the comprehensive strategy and supportive in-depth intelligence necessary to be effective [40].

In an attempt to enhance the security environment, US forces became deeply involved in the law enforcement mission, as previously noted. In addition to the ASF, MPs, Marines and Army Infantrymen became involved in policing against street bandits. Oakley stated in January, "We need a police force so we can pull out"[41]. By late January, UNITAF forces were spending a great deal of effort searching for and raiding arms caches, policing the streets (a job for which most troops were ill-prepared), and often striking mutual accommodation deals with clan leaders [42].

As demonstrated, the initial expectations of the UN and the NCA did not fully coincide, nor did UNITAF's avoidance of the disarmament strategy last for long. These miscalculations are more indicative of a lack of situational understanding at both the strategic and operational levels than any *modus operandi* changes on the part of the clans, and reflect failure in strategy and a "CIV" JTF failure. The security environment rapidly deteriorated within a month of the May 1993 US pullout, and continued until the eventual UNOSOM II withdrawal the following year. Apparently, UNITAF did not succeed in creating an environment conducive to uninterrupted aid delivery, especially given a predictably weaker UN force. Ultimately, the US - UN transition created a power

vacuum (similar to Barre's departure two years prior) in which clan leaders such as Aidid discerned weakness and were now able to apply their insurgent-like resources so skillfully husbanded during the UNITAF occupation.

Was the failure, then, more one of national policy, or misinterpretation at the operational level? The NCA and Pentagon never publicly forebode disarmament or demobilization, instead deferring to the operational commander's judgment as to whether armed groups posed a threat. The mission-creep was not actually a change in mission as dictated by the NCA or CINC, but a change in operational method indicating gradual understanding on the part of the COMJTF that prolific arms supplies did in fact pose a threat by providing an immediate capability which, when mixed with militaristic clans with hostile intent, presented a serious problem. However, a concerted disarmament policy was never fully defined, thus indicating a lack of understanding as to the nature of the threat posed to a much weaker UN follow-on force. The JTF elements by and large were not organized or trained for such a security mission, nor were their commanders or staffs prepared to deal with such far-reaching and disparate security problems. Near-term security problems involving Mission Essential Task List (METL)- related tactical missions (such as raids against arms caches, counter-sniper operations, and convoy security) were well within their purview, but not more complex tasks such as HUMINT gathering, Special Reconnaissance, law enforcement, or Civic Action. Many of these issues were deemed "political", despite the fact that an environment such as this fails to provide clear lines between "political" and "military" issues. General Purpose Forces, however, are by

necessity designed and trained to focus first and foremost on the "military" problems, and so will often belatedly recognize these political-military connections and eventual results.

d. Task Two

Once firmly in place in Somalia, UNITAF was to provide security for the passage and distribution of relief supplies, the second specified task from CINCENT. During Phase 3, UNITAF was to provide security for relief distribution in zone, as well as convoy security and armed reconnaissance as required [43]. In this mission, UNITAF forces performed exceedingly well. Small teams of Infantry, MPs, and service support personnel safely and efficiently facilitated distribution of approximately 778,827 metric tons of supplies [44] to many of the hardest hit areas, often in very unsure conditions with intermittent communications and minimal guidance. Most of these convoys were commanded at the company-grade officer level, and success was evident.

While one could consider this effort a complete success, one must consider not only the forces needed for the actual security operations, but other forces in-country as well, both US and coalition, and what these forces were tasked to do. The first thing that comes to mind when considering the security operations is a vision of thousands of soldiers patrolling convoy routes, manning checkpoints, guarding food warehouses, and protecting convoys. The truth is considerably different, however, and in this area hard facts and numbers are scarce. Therefore, I will review the numbers we have available and through some extrapolation and common-sense interpolation estimate how many personnel were actually conducting relief security operations during Phase III as opposed

to how many supported their efforts ("tooth-to-tail" ratio). Through this estimate, we will get some idea as to the efficient use of personnel in this task.

When considering Operators vs. Supporters, one must look at critical "direct support" provided to the HROs in food delivery and security. All US Infantry, Military Police, and Cavalry units are included in the operator count. Admittedly, other units (such as Engineer Road Construction and Bridging units, Transportation Movement Control detachments and truck companies, Civil Affairs and Special Forces, and Aviation) contributed to the mission. Quantifying this indirect effort is impossible, however, given the variety of activities assigned to these units. Therefore, I will use only the forces mentioned as a yardstick. Of the approximately 25,000 Americans serving in Somalia in January of 1993, the total from the USMC and Army for Infantry, MPs, and Cavalry was about 4,000 [45]. The overall tooth-to-tail, therefore, was about 1:5. Of these operators, at least 50% were needed to guard key installations and for local urban patrolling not directly related to relief supply distribution. Therefore, given this conservative estimate, no more than 2,000 personnel were available to perform the actual relief supply security, the main effort of Phase III. This left UNITAF with about a 1:10 tooth-to-tail (omitting the remaining 2,000 troops needed for static force-protection missions).

The 1:10 result demonstrates that UNITAF had more forces than it needed. The larger the force, the more effort it expends supporting and protecting itself. UNITAF needed an enormous amount of resources and personnel to support its very presence, and most of these personnel did not substantially contribute to the mission-essential tasks.

UNITAF suboptimized in this task, one for which a leaner, more flexible force could have provided the necessary security at a much lower cost.

Why then was such a large force employed? The answer lies in the "Critical Independent Variables". The standard US answer to an amorphous situation such as that faced in Somalia is to "pile on" the forces so as to theoretically provide the commander with excess capabilities and supposed resultant flexibility. Flexibility is actually reduced, however, given such a large force. The force becomes highly reliant on a large, complex support infrastructure. This infrastructure in turn calls for increasing numbers, and these personnel also place increased demands on the system. The US military accepts this ratio as the price to be paid in conducting large-scale operations, yet fails to recognize that it actually encumbers our capabilities in SSCs.

"Piling on" is thought to reduce risk. With a large force, the opposition should be deterred from engagement. If he does so choose, conventional wisdom dictates a vigorous and effective US response. This approach involves a traditional mind-set and experiences on the part of commanders, that of combat potential as a function of mass. Combat potential in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) may be more a function of the synergism of C4I (especially intelligence) with mobility (rapid-response) and flexible, controlled fire-power. A large force is often less capable in each of these areas as compared to small,

albeit skillfully led and supported units* .

While the HROs saved thousands of Somalis under UNITAF protection, this protection could have been provided at a much lower cost with enhanced effectiveness and positive resultant externalities. This concept deserves further exploration in the next chapter.

e. Tasks Four & 4 1/2

UNITAF's last specified task, that of transferring operations to the UN and terminating US operations, was in and of itself a success, in that C2 was transferred to UNOSOM II and US forces not detached to the UN redeployed. This success is a given, however, provided UNITAF departed Somalia and the UN assumed control. What must be analyzed is the capability of UNOSOM II to assume control of the operation begun by UNITAF upon handoff and still pursue its expansion into the rest of Somalia, as was the UN's goal. This is the critical implied task, one over which the JTF only exercised limited influence.

Certainly, the UNITAF commander had no control over mistakes later made by UNOSOM II, nor could he affect most of the composition and command

* This comparison between large conventional forces and SOF in LIC is controversial. Both types of forces play an important role in LIC. GPF combat units (with CS/CSS support) are critical in LIC for a variety of missions. The Army's FM 7-98 states, however, that, "Military operations in LIC are normally joint in nature and are characterized by the indirect versus direct application of force." [46]. Martin Van Creveld posits, "If armed forces—and most probably, the political units by whom they are fielded—are to survive and fight in earnest, they will have to become intermingled with each other and the civilian population... The spread of sporadic small-scale war will cause regular armed forces themselves to change form, shrink in size, and wither away" [47]. While "regular armed forces" will not "wither away", the implication is that their usefulness in LIC is limited. Opportunities to employ large units in LIC are limited by many factors, especially the enemy's ability to choose the battlefield. Only intensive HUMINT and rapid, restrained response will successfully root out the enemy forces without so alienating the populace that legitimacy is lost. SOF is ideally suited to develop such HUMINT while simultaneously coordinating appropriate response measures.

relationships which so plagued the UN in the months to come. There were areas in which UNITAF could help, however. First, the operational environment to be turned over to UN troops would prove to be critical. We have already discussed at some length as to whether UNOSOM II inherited a "secure environment", or a powder keg waiting for a UN match. While UNITAF was generally able to keep a lid on clan unrest through force dominance, the UN would not bring this capability. Both the UN and the US understood this shortcoming, as is evidenced by our provision of a QRF. The UN troops were to enter as an enhanced peacekeeping force, albeit under a strong Chapter VII mandate.

Requirements, however, do not automatically confer capabilities, and the UN certainly was not up to the combat portion of their task. Thus, the "secure environment" task again surfaces inasmuch as it affected the handoff to the UN. The UN in fact inherited the worst kind of situation: Somalia was apparently relatively benign in May of 1993, not because of either reconciliation or threat elimination, but because the clans chose not to challenge the superior UNITAF forces. Clan leaders such as Aidid still possessed the power to destabilize the situation and threaten the UN peacekeepers. If the clans and UNITAF had been more violently engaged in May, either the clan capabilities would have been removed, or a much more capable UNOSOM II force would have been introduced with a more thorough handoff. As it was, everyone underestimated clan intentions and capabilities, and the UN's situation and impartiality quickly unraveled as clan leaders smelled weakness.

While LtGen Johnston could not force the UNOSOM II participants to provide more transition personnel or provide them earlier, any more than he could

encourage the UN to speed passing of the UNOSOM II mandate, there were three other areas in addition to the "secure environment" factor in which he could have improved transition. One, handoff could have been delayed past 4 May to provide the new staff with more overlap experience. Two, US personnel designated to remain with UNOSOM II might have been better utilized at the JTF level. Three, a smaller, more decentralized JTF under UNITAF might have facilitated handoff to an admittedly small UNOSOM II staff.

As to the first solution, the CINC and COMJTF were under some degree of official pressure to hand off the Somalia responsibility to the UN as soon as possible, especially given suspicions that Boutros-Ghali was dragging his feet in an effort to keep the US in Somalia longer and continue the disarmament process before handoff to a "less well-armed" operation [48]. As to the second solution, few USFORSOM personnel worked in the UNOSOM II HQs, perhaps in an effort to force the UN staff under LTG Bir to not rely heavily on the US. A predominantly US headquarters by itself, however, would not have greatly enhanced perceived weakness at the unit tactical level. The third solution, however, could have made a greater difference. A streamlined UNITAF JTF, especially given the right tactical unit and liaison mix, might have made the "seamless transition" a reality. This concept will be explored further in the next chapter.

D. SUMMARY

We have explored the five critical tasks (four specified and one implied) from the CINCCENT mission statement to the COMJTF. In all five instances, suboptimization existed to varying degrees. This should not come as a surprise, for any military operation can be planned and executed in a more efficient and effective manner. Sometimes this lack

of efficiency is a product of external independent variables, such as the operational environment. Sometimes it is a product of organizationally internal dependent variables, such as orders from higher or the capabilities of a subordinate unit. Sometimes it results from simple mistakes or unforeseen problems (the "fog of war"), or at times even negligence on the part of individual decision makers. Certainly, these variables and others impacted UNITAF's performance in Somalia, as they do any operation, past, present, or future. These independent variables can rarely be predicted or influenced. The "CIVs", however, can be altered by rational choices made either before the crisis emerges, or before our military commits itself to a particular force structure. Such an up-front rational choice will yield tangible benefits for decision-makers and in the ultimate mission execution.

Organizational theory tells us that, in business, strategy is the company's formula for winning, and is important because "it establishes the criteria for choosing among alternative organizational forms" [49]. Organizational theory is just as applicable in the military as in business. In this case, the strategy of concern in establishment of a suitable organization is the strategy developed by the NCA, the JCS, and Regional CINC. Therefore, a suitable match of organization to strategy (given proper integration of the other organizational components) should yield success. Conversely, a mismatch will result in suboptimization and even mission failure. Arguably, we have observed such organizational failure in Vietnam, at Desert One, and on the streets of Mogadishu. UNITAF did not fail in its mission, nor did it succeed, for success in such a complex mission is measured multidimensionally. The critical question now remains: Given

dramatic organizational change, could UNITAF have appreciably improved its performance, possibly allowing UNOSOM II forces to avoid eventual overt failure, loss of life, and embarrassment? Or could UNITAF have performed just as well with far fewer resources? The answer to both questions is an emphatic yes.

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V. JTF-XXI AND OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

A. INTRODUCTION

Given the apparent lack of overall success in Somalia, the multi-billion dollar pricetag, and hundreds of casualties, one must say that the US could have been substantially more successful in Somalia, that it should have been much less costly, or both. The previous chapter demonstrated serious shortcomings in the UNITAF operation, many of which directly and indirectly contributed to the UN's problems in the follow-on phase. This chapter will apply the JTF-XXI model against Operation Restore Hope as an example of how such an organization might be more likely to approach optimization in the SSC realm. Such a counter-factual application is useful in that problem areas within UNITAF are addressed specifically, as opposed to the purely theoretical work of Chapter II. This application is not meant to second-guess informed decisions made by leaders in Washington, New York, Tampa, or Mogadishu. It is meant to illustrate to what extent organizational change might have led to different results, using the mission-specific criteria for optimization. The five mission-essential tasks will be assessed in relation to JTF-XXI*. JTF-XXI will be considered successful given substantial improvement in most criteria, and an effort will be made to assess negative effects (in regard to operations in Somalia) and to weigh these against the benefits. Implications and requirements of implementation will be addressed in the final chapter.

* Fiscal cost and long-term effects on the force will not be assessed here. Until further data becomes available (if it ever does), attempts to quantify these effects as they pertain to Restore Hope in specific terms is highly speculative. No hard numbers exist to show the amount of waste in this operation. Neither are there studies from Somalia thoroughly detailing the effects on combat effectiveness, morale, or retention.

B. THE MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASKS

1. Secure Facilities, Installations, and Relief Points

In On War, Carl von Clausewitz wrote:

The only situation a commander can know fully is his own; his opponent's he can only know from unreliable intelligence. His evaluation, therefore, may be mistaken and can lead him to suppose that the initiative lies with the enemy when in fact it remains with him...Men are always more inclined to pitch their estimate of the enemy's strength too high than too low, such is human nature.[1]

When UNITAF invaded Somalia in December, it did so in a textbook operational manner. Beachheads were secured, airfields commandeered, and forces consolidated and gradually fanned out to secure outlying objectives. "Ike" Eisenhower and Chesty Puller would have been duly impressed. The first weeks of Somalia displayed US conventional military might at its best. What it did not do, however, was reflect an accurate understanding of the situation in Somalia. What resulted was a huge conventional force slowly expanding outward from Mogadishu, either pushing the clans in front of it, or more often forcing the clans to temporarily go to ground or curtail active operations. What did not result was the neutralization of the causes of the famine in the first place: the militarized clans.

As mentioned in Chapter IV, the JTF entered Somalia with a poor idea of what type of opposition it faced, because accurate HUMINT was nearly nonexistent. The Army's After-Action Report (AAR) reads:

During the weeks and months immediately preceding the operation, intelligence factors directly influencing military planning for Operations Other Than War were misread. The realities of our IPB shortfalls began to surface with the amphibious assault by MARFOR to secure the sea and air

ports of Mogadishu, only to be met by the international news media and a grateful local populace. In this case, failure to identify clan intent (not to resist) was a major deficiency of the process that resulted in the deployment of unnecessary equipment. [2]

Opportunities to assess the situation in Somalia were ample, since UN and US personnel had been operating in Somalia for months. Somalia was not a closed country, at least from the perspective of a Special Forces operator. Special Forces teams could have infiltrated either overtly or covertly and assessed the true nature of the Somali military threat. They would have discovered that the Somalis, while capable of harassing the lightly armed UNOSOM I force, were incapable of presenting an effective resistance to US forces, and in fact would not even have wanted to do so.

Knowing that the landing would be unopposed, the COMJTF might have chosen to approach the operation differently. In Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti), US forces quickly shifted from the forced entry option, instead opting to near-simultaneously occupy the entire nation, with SOF teams assuming responsibility for 27 of the 30 permanently garrisoned sites and more than 700 villages [3]. In Somalia, many of the Marines and 10th Mountain combat units could have been held in reserve for "trouble spots" such as Mogadishu and Kismayo, allowing some units to remain at home or offshore. Logistics and transportation requirements would have been commensurately reduced, and the long-term impact on the I MEF and 10th Mountain would have been lessened.

The second failing in this initial phase might well have reduced any advantages gained from improved HUMINT gathering. If US commanders do not understand the nature of guerrilla warfare/LIC, they cannot capitalize on intelligence such as might have

been collected by special operators. The insurgent-type warrior seeks to carve out a “niche” in which he can operate relatively free of government interference. The size of his enemy is largely irrelevant, for he is always weaker. As long as the government (in this case UNITAF) remains in cantonment areas and only ventures forth to conduct limited operations and security patrols, the insurgent has the room to consolidate his hold, expand his niche, and strike his enemy at will. [4] Special operations personnel are trained to mix with the indigenous population as much as possible. By so doing, US personnel are attempting to deny the insurgent his niche, while at the same time discovering his vulnerabilities. However, conventional commanders think this is too risky, enforcing policies that discourage our operators from “grabbing the insurgent by the belt”. In reality, risk is increased when our forces avoid the populace. Aidid took advantage of his niche in the summer and fall of 1993.

If a SOF-led force had conducted initial entry into Somalia with an improved HUMINT-based intelligence picture, the force would have been smaller, cheaper, and more mobile. It would have been more effective, in that the initial key installations would have been more quickly secured, and follow-on forces could have moved to Phase II more quickly. What would the US have risked in such an approach? First, one might think that a smaller force on the ground would not deter the clans from attacking the SF teams. In order to compensate for its size, the SOF-based Sector Task Units (STUs) would have required Quick Reaction Force Contingency Task Units (CTUs) capable of rapid response by air or ground (with light armor, not soft-skinned vehicles). CTUs would have initially operated from offshore until onshore basecamps could be established. AC-130s, Close Air

Support, Aviation Attack Air, and naval gunfire from all services could have provided rapid fire support. (SOF teams are well-versed in employing all of these assets.) In a crisis, the devastating fire from an AC-130 gunship, followed by the prompt arrival of a heavily armed QRF would have quickly dispelled any notion that SOF teams were weak.

(Although SOF teams are small, one must never forget that they are well-armed, highly trained, and fully prepared physically and psychologically to either stand and fight until help arrives or evade as necessary.) Proper prior planning would facilitate such combined arms operations, especially under the auspices of the networked JTF-XXI.

The Army's Restore Hope AAR again states:

Although the basic principles of the IPB process were employed fully, application of traditional war fighting considerations failed to capture the unique character of the operation in time to impact planning, force design, and TPFDD development, resulting in less than optimal force projection...A better definition and description of the battlefield in Somalia might have changed the nature of the mission from forced entry, and the type and order of units brought into the country.[5]

It goes on to state:

Special Forces bring unique capabilities to the Operations Other Than War scenario—they must be exploited early in the HUMINT collection role...Had they (SF) been used to determine the clan intent prior to the Marine amphibious assault into Mogadishu, perhaps we would have known the benign nature of the threat.[6]

Using forced-entry capabilities such as in Somalia (as in most LIC environments) is often a waste of assets, is slow, and provides the enemy with ample opportunity to remain proactive.

2. Security and Assistance to HROs

The UNITAF forces performed well in the Humanitarian Relief area. A great deal of effort was put into this task, given that this was the reason for our presence in Somalia. However, the large UNITAF structure obviously siphoned off resources for its own self-sustainment, both in men and materiel, that could have otherwise been applied directly to the mission. If half the force was engaged in a security or support role for itself, UNITAF certainly sub-optimized from an efficiency perspective. Under JTF-XXI, the need for combat, combat support, and combat service support assets for this task would not be eliminated. However, STUs' reduced size in many sectors, especially the less hostile ones, would have reduced the force structure. Additionally, networked STUs could have provided a much clearer picture of the situation throughout Somalia, allowing commanders to adjust convoy security size to meet the actual need. The STUs would have acted as natural way stations for CTUs conducting convoy operations, and improved STU-provided communications and commensurate Quick Reaction capabilities would have further reduced risk and force size.

Given that the smaller JTF-XXI is more efficient, would it have been more effective in this task? First, consider the advantages of STUs with Special Forces, Civil Affairs, PSYOPs, medical personnel, USAID, HRO representatives, etc., strategically placed throughout Somalia, each conducting simultaneous, rapid, and on-going assessments of the current humanitarian need. The Restore Hope AAR addresses this need with:

The nature of the operation is such that CS, CSS, and Civil Affairs units have an equal if not greater role than the combat units... Additionally, units

were task organized, given missions, and assigned AOs based in road nets, humanitarian relief sectors, and proximity of built up areas. Had a more complete analysis of clan/sub-clan and warlord alignments been available to the planners, these alignments might have been adjusted to better suit the expanded role of the commander as a local political/military mediator.[7]

Information is fed directly to the JTF-XXI CMOC and intermediate commands, allowing commanders to plan for and allocate without guesswork or extensive reconnaissance efforts prior to action. HROs will quickly come to view the military as facilitator, not inhibitor, while commanders at all levels get instant ground-truth. Security threats can be identified and dealt with promptly, usually by the STUs negotiating with clan leaders, and if necessary by bringing in CTUs to act with force.

Finally, STU personnel would be in an ideal position to build inter-personal relationships with local clan leaders and village elders. These relationships by themselves solve most potential problems before they get to the point where an infantry battalion has to roll in and settle the issue. Such settling can sometimes create more problems than it solves.

3. Establish Secure Environment

Establishment of such a long-term secure environment was to become a major problem once UNOSOM II assumed control, for UNITAF in fact failed to create such an environment. Again, UNITAF commanders failed to recognize the nature of the situation in Somalia prior to initial entry. The US attitude was initially very hands-off toward the militias, only gradually shifting to a disarmament policy. The US first tried to negotiate demobilization, and in fact was successful in many areas. Intransigent clan-leaders,

however, forced the shift toward involuntary demobilization, a situation which ultimately led to the Aidid crisis. The results of this failure were devastating for UNOSOM II and US policy in Somalia, for without a secure environment, national reconciliation was never likely. Could JTF-XXI have fared better?

Much of the US reluctance to attempt clan disarmament was based on NCA policy and sound peacekeeping doctrine. The US was not looking for a full-blown LIC in Somalia. We were there to stabilize the situation and feed the hungry. However, the COMJTF exercised considerable authority in deciding how to pursue the stability issue. The much-discussed long-term solution was that of national reconciliation. Perhaps, however, we could have learned a lesson from the Somali northern provinces, who essentially seceded from the rest of Somalia, and were able to then establish some sense of social order. This is not to suggest that Somalia should have been carved up into dozens of competing fiefdoms. However, some sense of separation might have produced a cooling-off period after almost a generation of inter-clan fighting. After a time, perhaps, the Somalis might have recognized commonalities and begun to work toward reconciliation. Such an altered approach would certainly have been within the purview of LtGen Johnston to recommend as an intermediate fix, one which might have bought the UNOSOM II forces a little more breathing space. However, LtGen Johnston's JTF was not organized to establish what would have amounted to "separate provinces", each with its own military/interagency/HRO effort in support of budding local governments.

This approach would have required long-term vision, instead of short-term focus on immediate quantifiable results. STUs would have been ideal for negotiating low-

visibility agreements on the local level. Aspiring national leaders like Aidid would have found little incentive to resist, and less international exposure to feed his ambitions.

On the other hand, if the COMJTF-XXI did choose to demobilize some or all of the clans, Sector Task Units again would have been ideally suited to effect such a policy. Whether by gathering intelligence and planning arms raids or through less conventional techniques*, the STUs could have conducted operations more effectively and efficiently, especially with CTU support (situation dependent). Such an approach might have allowed the JTF-XXI to confront the clan militias early-on. Demilitarization could have been conducted simultaneously throughout Somalia, since the clans could not have pushed their heavy weapons beyond UNITAF's reach. If the clans tried to cache their weapons, teams already in place would have detected such a move, allowing the JTF-XXI force to quickly react.

Instead of acting effectively to provide for some type of long-term stability, UNITAF unknowingly pushed the problem off on the UNOSOM II troops. The Somali clans maintained much of their military capabilities and the initiative, in spite of any US efforts to gain the upper hand. In deference to LtGen Johnston and his troops, UNITAF did the best it could to improve the security environment. However, its very composition restricted it from acting in any other way. LtGen Johnston worked within the capabilities of his staff and components. They just were not constructed to do what the UN needed.

* Special Forces personnel have extensive institutional and personal experience in the area of demobilization derived from the SF Unconventional Warfare role[8]. Such subtle approaches sometimes prove more effective than "cash-for-arms" and seizures, both of which usually prove highly problematic.

4. Transfer Operations to UN and Facilitate UNOSOM II Success

As noted in the previous chapter, two major hurdles stood between UNITAF and a successful handoff to the UNOSOM II organization. First, UNITAF had not reduced the clans' capabilities to make mischief for an admittedly less capable UN force. Second, UNITAF was a large, complex organization, one which the UN could not hope to replicate. Thus, the UNOSOM II structure was incapable of meeting the current C2 requirements, not to mention those soon to be imposed by increasingly restive clan leaders like Aidid.

The first problem harkens back to the "secure environment" issue. UNITAF did not substantially reduce clan militias' capabilities, otherwise the clans would not have been able to so openly challenge UN forces (as they did with the Pakistanis in June). The violence level would have remained very low for quite some time, limited to occasional snipings and minings, but certainly not a large-scale ambush just one month after the US pull-out. Two plausible explanations for this situation exist. Either the US military assumed (incorrectly) that the militias no longer posed a threat, or it knew of the threat but was unwilling or unable to deal with it.

If we underestimated the threat to the UN, this points to a HUMINT error, a prevalent failing throughout the operation. SOF STUs closely monitoring the militias via the populace would have been in a much better position to detect the capabilities and potential intent to cause problems. As it was, heavily bunkered forces relied on very small contingents of SOF and military intelligence personnel to collect over a wide area. These

activities were not sufficient during Restore Hope, and UNOSOM II soldiers would pay dearly for this oversight.

LtGen Johnston was told to withdraw his forces as soon as he could, based on his judgment that LTG Bir was up to the task. By 4 May, UNOSOM II appeared as ready as it was ever likely to be, and Bir and Johnston decided not to phase the handoff, but to shift control all at once[9]. The UNITAF commander was caught in a bad spot. While he was to leave behind a QRF and small logistics units, he possessed no intermediate C2 option, one which would allow him to remove the bulk of US troops while still continuing "business as usual" until the UN headquarters was fully capable. Supported by GEN Hoar (USCINCENT) and the NCA, Johnston believed UNITAF's continued presence must entail a mission change from the president. He believed that UNITAF had fulfilled its mandate [10].

LTG Bir could not possibly have cobbled together such an extensive, complicated JTF headquarters as that fielded by LtGen Johnston. This will not be the last time the US hands off operational control to a much smaller UN or coalition headquarters. These follow-on forces will not be able to operate effectively without an organization onto which they can overlay their own C2 structure, and they will need to do so gradually and with our assistance. With JTF-XXI, a smaller US headquarters would have simplified the back-stop process. Each of LTG Bir's staff members would only have had to learn the job of his predecessor and continue the process. Instead, the entire organization had to constantly improvise in learning not only how to work together, but also how to do more with less. At the tactical level, the SOF core of each STU would have remained in place long enough

to transition the UN STU (or whatever type organization would assume control of the sector). Only once the UN headquarters and each new STU were comfortable and effective would each SOF team have redeployed.

Although President Clinton was anxious to bring US troops home, the continued presence of a few Special Operations units would not have caused a ripple of protest, either in Congress or the media. SOF teams are small and discrete. Americans expect them to be deployed, and their continued presence would not have been remarkable. Ultimately, the idea is to use Special Forces STUs to mind the store until the new owner gets comfortable and can be effective. STUs would have provided the intermediate option needed to make the transition truly seamless. Perhaps an ongoing American STU presence in south Mogadishu might have forestalled the situation leading to the 5 June Pakistani ambush and the subsequent hunt for Aidid*.

C. SUMMARY

In studying US military operations in Somalia, major shortcomings become apparent. These are not shortcomings due to a lack of professionalism and dedication on the part of LtGen Johnston, the personnel under his command, or the coalition military and civilian professionals who worked so hard to transform Somalia. The possibility exists that international intervention in Somalia was a lost cause from the outset. We will never know if organizational changes such as those proposed through the JTF-XXI model

* Lacking doctrine and training, the Pakistanis reportedly sharply reduced day and night patrolling in south Mogadishu. Aidid was able to infiltrate heavy weapons and reinstate his military presence.[11] The Pakistanis needed SF STUs to support and "encourage" them in their duties.

would have altered the course of events. However, this really does not matter now. Our study of operations in Somalia should serve to illuminate prominent shortcomings in similar operations, allowing us to do better next time.

The first and most critical need in SSC MOOTW is for an organization that can serve as an umbrella for the total effort. Such an organization must be able to keep overall US policy in focus at all times and at all levels. No longer is it sufficient for the COMJTF alone to worry about long term implications, allowing the tactical commanders to focus on specific tactical issues. Every action taken in MOOTW has potentially over-arching diplomatic and political implications. Therefore, the US needed a force of "generalists" in Somalia, military personnel at all levels who would view the situation in terms of years, not weeks. UNITAF needed a sizable package of culturally and linguistically oriented professional soldiers, capable of negotiating with a clan leader in one village, or calling in an AC-130 strike in another, situation dependent. More importantly, it needed a force ready-made and trained to mold the joint and coalition military forces, the multiple US governmental agencies, and the Humanitarian Relief Organizations into an effective partnership at every level. Such an effort would have allowed the true "specialists", whether they be aid workers or infantrymen, to concentrate on their specialties while still remaining connected to the other pieces.

JTF-XXI would have been in a much better position to promote and prosecute HUMINT operations before, during, and after UNITAF operations. As already noted, such intelligence would have provided the COMJTF with a much clearer picture of the situation. Vastly improved HUMINT might have allowed the US to eliminate the clans'

abilities to operate effectively against UNOSOM II forces and ultimately disrupt the national reconciliation effort. Such elimination might have been the result of negotiation in one sector, military force in another, and some form of trickery in a third. Only a low-key, unconventional-minded force spread throughout Somalia could hope to produce such long-term effects without appearing as invaders to the indigenous and possibly provoking belligerents such as Aidid to precipitous action.

This chapter has stressed the HUMINT shortcomings experienced by UNITAF as compared to JTF-XXI. At this stage, a dose of reality would be welcomed by JTF-XXI skeptics. The reality is this: no level of intelligence from any source or combination of sources will ever give the commander a perfect picture of his opponent. Whether the commander is a conventional warrior or special operator, he will always be making a "best-guess" estimate and then acting based on his experience and own good judgment. When fighting a unified adversary, the US normally possesses a clear intelligence advantage, which is then convertible into military opportunities. However, in MOOTW, many adversaries or potential adversaries may be confronted, all with differing and shifting objectives. To expect the COMJTF and his staff to collect, process, disseminate, and act in a consistently timely manner upon the vast array of available information is to ask the near-impossible. However, each STU and its higher may well be able to do so on a local basis, given the right training, experience, and access to national collection assets. Intelligence developed at this local level could be simultaneously fed to the JTF, keeping the commander updated without slowing the translation of intelligence into military or diplomatic action.

Change in places like Somalia does not come easy. While overwhelming force is sometimes the answer to specific problems in specific areas, it is not a general remedy, and can often prove counterproductive to US policy objectives. The US needed a robust, diversified, joint and interagency force package in Somalia. We had that. What we did not have was an organization capable of tying it all together, able to relate the considerable US and coalition capabilities to Somali needs and requirements at every level of society and in every village and town. MOOTW requires a long-term, specifically-tailored approach to each problem area with the long-term goals always in view. While UNITAF usually succeeded at the tactical level, it was unable to successfully realize the operational objectives necessary to facilitate the UN's establishment of a lasting peace in Somalia* .

* Many, including MG Montgomery, would say that the UN was totally incapable of succeeding in its goals of general disarmament[12] and eventual national reconciliation, and it therefore would not have mattered anyway. This may very well be true. However, it does not mean that UNITAF could not have optimized its performance given the JTF-XXI change, providing the UN forces with a much better chance of ultimate success. As it stood, the US caught the Somali hand-grenade before it exploded, then unknowingly handed it back to the UN without reinserting the pin.

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VI. CONCLUSION

Change is not made without inconvenience, even from worse to better.

Richard Hooker, English Theologian [1]

A. OVERVIEW

The first chapter of this thesis described the need for a major change in the manner in which the US military approaches certain MOOTW-type Smaller-Scale Contingency operations. The current command and force structure for these operations is appropriate in wartime, but proves to be severely sub-optimal in MOOTW. The second chapter proposed a possible model for such a change. While not the only possibility, the JTF-XXI proposal places Special Operations forces at the helm of certain appropriate operations, and allows for further examination and discussion. Chapters III and IV highlighted issues and problem areas critical to the US participation in the Somali humanitarian relief efforts in Somalia. The case-study provided a framework for later application of the JTF-XXI proposal because it involved most of the critical factors involved in the types of MOOTW identified as requiring an altered approach. In Chapter V, the JTF-XXI model was compared to the UNITAF structure in a counter-factual examination of "what might have been" if a JTF-XXI had run the show.

This final chapter examines how to implement the JTF-XXI concept as it affects these organizations. Two main elements must be considered before such a change can be instituted. First, the current force structure, training, doctrine, equipment, and budgeting

will be reviewed and recommendations for modifications will be made. Second, how such changes would most likely affect SOF and the General Purpose Forces will be examined.

B. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

1. Structure

Joint Task Force XXI is designed to take maximum advantage of current organizations. Major restructuring, while potentially necessary in the long term, is not a requirement in the near term to allow JTF-XXI to optimize military performance. The Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (the basic 12-man "A" team) is well-structured to perform the JTF-XXI mission. Rod Paschall writes:

The basic Special Forces detachment of twelve mature soldiers with an average of ten years experience whose training, doctrine, make-up, and primary reason for being is to train, advise, and assist indigenous forces has existed for forty years. Thus, there is nothing new to create...Existing SOF command and control structures are capable of commanding both their own forces and those general purpose force attachments that might be added to any particular peace operations task.[2]

CA and PSYOP teams should be attached to all STUs, or on a mission-dependent basis if there are not enough to go around. While SF teams possess some CA and PSYOP capabilities, augmentation by the experts in high-risk or critical areas would be greatly beneficial. These augmentations must be long term, preferably for the duration of the STU mission.* Combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units, however, would be placed under operational control of the STU for particular operations or phases.

* Although the majority of CA personnel are reservists, long term deployments are nothing new to these citizen-soldiers. However, the services need to increase the number of reserve and active-duty CA in order to handle such an integral and expanded role without undue hardship for the service members.

The Special Forces companies, battalions, and groups are also well-suited to such an expanded role, albeit with attachments and some readjustments. One such readjustment to encourage integration of CA, PSYOP, and GPF elements is proposed by the former JFK Special Warfare Center's Commanding General and his Director of Training and Doctrine. MG Garrison and COL Florer believe that an "Exceptional Force" (a task-organized ARSOF brigade commanded by a brigadier general) could serve as the operational focal-point for MOOTW:

In combining the capabilities of SF, CA, and PSYOP with the capabilities of these other elements, we produce the nucleus of a dynamic team that provides the theater CINC with a tool that can be used to lead, support or advise the joint and interagency team efforts.[3]

The "Exceptional Force" minus its mission-related operational attachments would provide the organizational, equipment, and training focus needed when the force is not employed in toto. When deployed for an SSC, the "Exceptional Force" commanding general could either assume command of the JTF-XXI or, in larger operations, become the COMSOC's deputy. This means that the current one-star SOC position must be upgraded to a two-star billet. Such an upgrade in the COMSOC billet is critical in the larger SSCs. When recently asked about the GPF in support of SOF in MOOTW, GEN Hugh Shelton (USCINCSOC at the time) was supportive of the idea. He responded:

One problem is the rank structure, where a two-star will always command a one-star. Another problem is that SOF is usually trained as the JSOTF, not JTF, and a CINC in a big contingency will usually turn to his JTF.[4]

If properly structured, the JTF-XXI should never call for a component commanded by a three-star. Therefore, the upgraded COMSOC will have plenty of firepower on his collar. As to the Chairman's second concern, some traditional, cultural barriers must be lowered before the regional CINCs will turn over these operations to SOF. Fortunately, CINCs develop habitual working relationships with their COMSOCs. Everyday ownership of the SOC would serve to reassure the CINC that he is not sending out a loose cannon.

The General Purpose Forces are generally well-structured to support JTF-XXI. In most JTF-XXI SSCs, brigade-sized units will be needed, not divisions. Therefore, "modular" type units will be most effective. Such units would be largely self-sufficient (at least capable of integrating with the JTF-level support structure). The Marine Corps' Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the Army's Separate Brigade are especially well-suited to such tasks. Each unit is comparatively self-sufficient, bringing its own CS and CSS support to the theater. In order to deploy line brigades from regular infantry or armor divisions, substantial logistics and combat support assets must be "sliced" from the division and corps levels. Since regular brigades will certainly be used, every effort must be made to prepare them in advance to conduct long-term operations thousands of miles from their divisional and corps support commands. Reserve and National Guard CS/CSS units could be tapped as "round-out" in support of these brigades, allowing the state-side corps and divisions to be logistically fully capable for emergent mid-intensity crises.

Such a modular approach must also be pushed down to battalion, and even company, levels. Battalions may be called upon to deploy without their brigades, and will certainly have to operate at times far from parent brigades while in theater. Companies, as

well, will likely operate with STUs, far from their battalions. Water purification, aviation, transportation, and refueling capabilities, to mention a few, must be redundantly available at nearly all levels.

US governmental agencies must also adjust structurally. The same modular approach used by the military in JTF-XXI must also be employed by the CIA, USAID, the Departments of State and Justice, and any other involved organization. Interagency Action Groups such as those proposed by RADM Paul David Miller, with deployable representatives from each agency, should be employed [5]. These teams would liaise at each level, from the JTF to the STU, providing a continuity of effort and cross-spectrum interface. Most interagency problems could be solved at the lowest level and on the spot, simply by having a representative from each collocated with each other and the military commander responsible for the area. Colonel Ed Phillips, a Special Forces Group commander and expert on military/inter-agency issues, writes:

True jointness is interagency. But the broader art of the possible beyond 2010 lies in the eventual restructuring of national defense forces consisting of many agencies along cross-functional lines.[6]

Few would argue that greater inter-agency communication and cooperation would serve to optimize the overall US government effort.

Our coalition partners should be assisted in preparing for SSC operations. While little can be done ahead of time for most (NATO partners being perhaps the exception), even a modest effort toward their preparation would be extremely helpful. For instance, once a country has volunteered to help with a US-led SSC, it is incumbent on the US

military to ensure that forces provided will help, not hinder, a mission. The coalition partners should be guided in the formulation of modular deploying units. If such units are not relatively self-sufficient and must be included anyway (for military, political, or psychological reasons), then US or other allied CS/CSS units designated ahead of time as "general support" may be needed in direct support of these elements. Finally, liaison teams, preferably Special Forces personnel from the STUs with whom they will work, should link up with these elements as early as possible, long before they deploy to the theater. Such teams will prove indispensable in providing information, training, and in identifying and solving problems before they impact on mission effectiveness.

This list of structural adjustments is not all-inclusive, but instead highlights the major changes needed. Even without JTF-XXI, these changes would enhance our capabilities in all types of MOOTW. Similarly, JTF-XXI would still potentially perform better than the standard JTF even without these changes.

2. Training & Doctrine

Under the current approach to MOOTW, units and individuals must be trained from scratch for most of the critical MOOTW-related tasks they will face. When the MOOTW is also a Smaller-Scale Contingency operation, commanders are faced with a no-win choice between training and deployment preparations given the typically short timeline. When time is extremely short, training often must be sacrificed. The services' reaction, then, is to try to incorporate some type of generic MOOTW training into annual training requirements or at national training centers. This approach robs time and resources from war-time tasks, but is better than nothing for commanders trying to do

more with less. Under the JTF-XXI concept, the list of tasks for which a given unit would have to prepare would be shortened. Units would increasingly be used within their war-time mission profiles. For the most part, they are already trained in mission-essential tasks needed, since each unit would be employed according to its capabilities more so than requirements. The advantage of JTF-XXI is in the synergy created through the modular assimilation of multiple capabilities at every stage, right down to the tactical execution level.

Special Forces personnel would continue to train at both the institutional and unit levels in their current form. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) deployments will continue to be the most applicable to SSCs. Language training will remain a critical individual skill, as will the cultural attenuation to be gained from FID. Special Forces personnel should maintain their combat capabilities, such as Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance. SOF will continue to be needed in these capacities in war-time, as well as in the fluid SSC realm. Special Reconnaissance (SR) remains critical, especially if SOF is to capitalize in the HUMINT arena*. If SF STUs are to provide C2 for limited combat operations, then their personnel must also remain intimately familiar with Direct Action operations.

Given this requirement, Special Operations personnel will need to increase their level of tactical training with the GPF. Special Operations personnel at all echelons should participate in conventional combat arms training exercises, with both combat and CS/CSS units. While all Special Forces personnel today are recruited from conventional occupational specialties (normally with at least four years of experience), knowledge

* Not all HUMINT is cloak-and-dagger, just as not all SR is sitting in a hole.

becomes dated and conventional skills rusty. At least by observing the planning and execution phases, special operators can become "reblued" and thus more able to properly employ general purpose assets. Such cross-training works both ways, and across all services. Fortunately, not all SFODA personnel have to be highly proficient in every area. One or two subject matter experts in each field per detachment would provide the needed expertise. Such intra-service cross-training is not currently needed for most special operations units, and therefore is rarely seen. Personnel exchange programs within the US military and with allies would also improve inter-operability for SSCs and war-time alike.

Conventional combat units should continue to train toward war-time requirements, with occasional MOOTW Situational Training Exercises thrown into larger exercises at the tactical level, preferably in conjunction with Special Forces. Conventional units would not need to increase training requirements in MOOTW. Some pre-deployment training would still be required, but annual requirements could be reduced. Most CS and CSS units do not need to train specifically toward MOOTW at all, except for CA, Military Police, and a few others. Support personnel should instead remain ready and proficient at their primary support tasks, all of which continue to be viable in SSCs.

Most of the training for the JTF-XXI mission will take place at the proposed Special Forces Brigade (or current Group), SF battalion, and SOC levels. At these levels, the interagency crisis response teams, the military, and NGO representatives (or role-players) should conduct simulations in order to lay the foundation for real-world operations. An annual or biannual joint/interagency exercise should be held in each theater, in which representatives of each organization participate and prepare for different types of

MOOTW contingencies. These exercises should be highly visible to allow for critique and suggestions, and representatives from the other theaters should attend and observe. Since the USCINACOM is the MOOTW proponent, this command could set up a rotation which might cover all the likely contingencies. Finally, frequent coalition partners such as Great Britain, Canada, and France should be invited to participate in the joint exercises, as so should the NGOs.

Some doctrinal changes will need to be made. While most of the basic principles of MOOTW remain unchanged, command relationships will certainly change. Rod Paschall writes, "Standing SOF institutions have the ability to write doctrine for peace operations, and existing SOF schools can teach that doctrine to SOF and the leadership of other U.S. forces"[7]. SOF should not, however, develop doctrine in a vacuum. A great deal of outstanding doctrine has been developed by the Joint Staff and the services. Further inter- and intra-service cooperation is certainly called for, although with SOF as the lead agent in doctrine development as well as in execution. Evolving, cooperative efforts toward the modification of MOOTW command and control doctrine will aid immensely in reassuring regional CINCs that SOF can effectively and efficiently conduct SSC operations without "dropping the ball".

3. Equipment

The restructuring of command and control for SSCs is meant to capitalize on the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of participating units. This includes equipment; there is currently no need to drastically alter the Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) for any single element. The vehicles, aircraft, weapons,

communications, and various other types of equipment needed for SSC MOOTW are out there in abundance. The trick is in finding the right combinations and right C2 element to make the most out of what the military has to offer.

A Marine or Army Infantryman would quickly recognize most of what the Special Forces detachment brings to an SSC. Small arms, body armor, night vision devices, and individual issue equipment are virtually identical. The medical equipment is extensive, although standard issue. The detachment's radios are compatible, although Special Forces possess a much greater array of long-range communications such as satellite and high-frequency radios.

The equipment advantages of the SF detachment lie primarily in its trauma medical capabilities and especially long-range communications. The typical conventional tactical combat unit is not equipped with organic long-range communications, instead relying on higher to establish "nets", where communications are relayed to and filtered by multiple levels. SF, however, can consistently communicate at nearly any level anywhere in the world. Conventional units could rely on SF communications without having to establish their own long-range capabilities. In this manner, whole communications battalions may be eliminated from some SSCs, at least until later in deployment flows.

With an increased presence of Special Forces medics throughout an area of operations, multiple field hospitals would be unneeded (at least for service members). Casualties could be treated and stabilized on-scene by these highly trained trauma experts, then through-put directly to one or two central treatment facilities, preferably off-shore. These medics also have a great deal of diagnostic capabilities, eliminating much of the field

medical care needed for routine illnesses and injuries. None of this is to remotely suggest that we eliminate prompt medical care for the sick or injured. Instead, it suggests that the training and equipment already on-scene in the form of the SF medic is far superior to that of a conventional medic or corpsman, allowing the precious evacuation time to be devoted to bringing the stabilized patient to a fully-capable trauma center, not an aid station or evacuation hospital.

The JTF-XXI will face two emerging equipment challenges. One is in continuing the USSOCOM C4I initiatives, creating a truly networked system employing digitized long-range communications tied to durable, reliable information technology. The conventional Army is pursuing its digitized tactical communications efforts under Force XXI. The second challenge, therefore, is to ensure that the two systems are fully compatible. To independently develop separate short-range and long-range digitization would be wasteful. In the future, the separation between long and short-range systems will become transparent to the operator and the JTF commander alike. For the time being, the STU must be capable of communicating with its supporting units. That capability currently exists in Special Forces, but is not considered a high priority. SF does not often work with conventional forces at the tactical level, and must therefore continue to make an effort to remain properly equipped as the GPF evolves*. However, as long as our forces can get the job done, equipment will not be a critical factor in these SSCs.

* Fortunately, the continual infusion of SF operators from the conventional Army ensures that GPF techniques and systems are well-understood in SF. Increased training with the GPF would enhance interoperability even further.

4. Budget

In the words of Colonel Mark Boyatt, commanding officer of 3d Special Forces Group (Airborne) for Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti:

Finally, and most important, Special Forces units must become actively involved outside the United States to gain more insight into the various regions and to assist with regional stability... The strength of Special Forces is in their cultural focus, and we must capitalize upon this strength. To accomplish these goals, we must significantly increase funding and priority for unconventional operations.[8]

For the conventional military officer, such words are an anathema. Typically, funding is a zero-sum game. "If you get more, I lose". Would SOF need budgetary increases in order to execute JTF-XXI? Certainly it would. Any OPTEMPO increase entails cost. However, the cost of deploying an infantry brigade for one six-month SSC would keep all seven SF groups fully employed for a year or more. The fact of the matter is that SF, CA, and PSYOP are extremely cheap. A few million dollars a year would be an astronomical budgetary increase to Special Operations units, especially considering the small personnel numbers involved*. Therefore, a very modest budgetary reallocation to USSOCOM earmarked for MOOTW R&D and acquisitions, training, and O&M would suffice. Money saved by the services through non-deployment of unnecessary units and equipment could be used in ongoing research and fielding of non-lethal weapons, the joint training exercises needed in conjunction with JTF-XXI, and of course for the SSCs themselves.

* A typical line SF company numbers between 60 and 80 personnel. There are three such companies per battalion, three battalions per group.

C. IMPLICATIONS OF IMPLEMENTATION

1. General Purpose Forces

The US military's General Purpose Forces have the most to gain from the JTF-XXI concept. While units will still deploy in support of SSC operations, there will be fewer of them gone at a given time, thus reducing PERSTEMPO military-wide. More units will remain at home station, able to train and stay ready for the next MRC. Morale will be higher, for deployments will be less frequent and possibly of shorter duration, giving the soldier more time devoted to training or his or her family. More money will be available for training and theoretically for morale and family support. Fewer airlift and sealift assets will be tied down, further enhancing overall GPF rapid deployability. At the same time, units will still deploy on these coveted real-world operations but will be used within their capabilities. (Such deployments are still important in "seasoning" our future leadership.) Small-unit leaders will mature as they are given more responsibility, and will learn to operate semi-autonomously, often physically disconnected from sister units. Our future leaders will need these skills in the next century, as our forces continue to physically disperse as a means of protection.

There are some perceived down-sides to the JTF-XXI concept. Conventional two and three star admirals and generals would no longer command Joint Task Forces on certain Smaller-Scale Contingency operations. Division commanders will no longer deploy their divisions to feed the hungry or settle tribal disputes. While brigade, battalion, and company commanders will never relinquish command of their units, they will often receive mission-type orders from their SOF counterparts. Sometimes, one may even find situations

where a Special Forces Warrant Officer or senior non-commissioned officer might be in a position to give orders to an infantry company commander. In MOOTW, we need to increasingly view command and control as more a function of expertise and practical exigencies than our traditional rank structure. This means that our structure, doctrine, training, and professional culture must support this shift. We must remember that the traditional strength of our military is not in its regimented adherence to strict, unthinking discipline. It is in our common-sense, practical and very distinctly American approach to problem-solving. First we as a team solve the problem, then we argue about who was in charge.

2. Special Operations Forces

In the final analysis, SOF will also benefit from JTF-XXI. Such benefit will at times be more subtle, however, because it may mean an increase in OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. The number of new special operators accessing into SOF is finite, essentially a proportion of the GPF. So, as the GPF goes, so usually do the Special Operations units it feeds. If OPTEMPO increases, more special operators will be away from home-station training and their families. As to the first, an interesting paradox is observed. While the combat readiness of GPF units may decline while deployed for MOOTWs, the readiness and capabilities of SOF actually increases dramatically when deployed. Teams are able to live and work together full-time, performing most of those tasks that Special Forces will be called upon to perform in war-time. Gathering HUMINT, practicing linguistic and cultural skills, and exercising medical, communications, and GPF or coalition C2 are all core requirements. As to an increase in PERSTEMPO, one does not

tend to notice serious morale problems in SOF until personnel are gone well over 6 months per year, and often not until the 8 or 9 month range. When not deployed, these soldiers' time must be considered a precious commodity not to be squandered.

Through JTF-XXI, our Special Forces, CA, and PSYOP will become better at the MOOTW mission, and will also become more "purple". Working jointly and with multiple agencies will enhance SOF's capabilities to support the GPF in war-time. From both operating and training together, each will have a better understanding of each other's strengths and weaknesses. Such cross-training with each other and coalition partners will prove invaluable in the next conflict, especially as our militaries shrink in size and thus become more reliant on small units and individuals. Both SOF and the GPF would benefit from further review of why we should or why we should not change our approach to command and control.

D. SUMMARY

Our military and civilian leadership must take a hard, fundamental look at how the United States approaches peace operations. The world is too complex to continue routinely facing each new challenge with the same organizational solution. We must look to those organizations and people, in and out of uniform, who are best up to the less traditional military challenges our nation will face in the coming years. In the words of General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "The world is evolving into how SOF is already organized, trained and equipped...we're geared up with the right people and equipment"[9]. Now is the time to put these people into action.

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